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INTRODUCTION 
While attention to the issue of incidental findings (IFs) 
arising specifically in the context of biobanks and secondary 
research is relatively new, it marks the convergence of two 
more developed areas of inquiry—what to do with IFs arising 
from biomedical research generally and what to do with 
biological specimens and data containing DNA information 
once they have been extracted from their human sources.1 
When they first garnered attention, these two areas of inquiry 
were largely the focus of bioethical questions: 
• What benefits and harms, if any, do IFs pose for human 
subjects?2 
                                                          
 1. The term by which we should refer to the individuals from whom 
specimens or DNA data are extracted and used for research has been debated 
in the literature, including in the consensus report that serves as the center 
for this Symposium. See Susan M. Wolf et al., Special Article, Managing 
Incidental Findings and Research Results in Genomic Research Involving 
Biobanks and Archived Data Sets, 14 GENETICS MED. 361, 364 (2012). As 
explained by Wolf et al. and in Part I of this paper, these individuals do not 
fall within the federal regulatory definition of “human subjects” if they cannot 
be readily identified by the researchers using their specimens or data and if 
their specimens or data were collected either for purposes other than the 
research in question or by another institution that has stripped and retained 
individually identifying information from the specimens or data. The issues 
addressed in this paper and in the consensus report, however, involve both 
individuals who meet this regulatory definition of “human subject” and those 
who do not. The consensus report adopts the term “contributors” to refer to 
individuals whose specimens or data are extracted and used for research 
regardless of whether they also qualify as “human subjects” under federal 
regulations. Id. We, however, choose here to use the term “human sources” as 
we find that “contributors” implies a decision by these individuals to 
contribute to research, whereas many of the issues for concern posed in this 
paper pertain to situations in which the individual was given no opportunity 
to make such a decision to contribute. Thus, the reader should bear in mind 
that, for the purposes of this paper, “human subjects” are all “human sources” 
but not all “human sources” are human subjects.” 
 2. In this paper, we use “human research subjects” to refer broadly to 
individuals whose specimens and data are used in the course of research, 
including human sources agreeing to participate in research and human 
sources whose specimens and data are used in research without their 
knowledge or consent. However, as explained in Part I, current guidance from 
the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) advises that human 
sources are human subjects but that researchers are not engaged in human 
subjects research when the specimens and data used in research were not 
collected for the purposes of that research and are not readily identifiable by 
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• What rights, if any, should human subjects have to be informed 
of IFs?3 
• What duties, if any, do researchers bear to inform human 
subjects about IFs? 
• To whom do specimens and data containing DNA information 
belong once they have been extracted from their human sources? 
• What rights, if any, do human sources of such specimens and 
data have to decide when, by whom, and for what purpose their 
DNA information can be used in research? 
Indeed, earlier ethical and legal analysis of the issues 
surrounding IFs put forth conclusions such as: 
  We argue that researchers owe research participants duties that 
are both ethical and legal obligations: to disclose in the informed 
consent process the possibility of discovering IFs and the plan for 
management; to recognize an IF that arises during the course of 
research; to verify the presence of the IF and evaluate its probable 
importance, obtaining expert consultation if necessary; and to offer to 
disclose an IF of likely clinical or reproductive importance to the 
research participant.4 
  To treat someone as a mere means to gathering proteins or genes 
or to observing the interaction between T-cells and virus is to treat 
them as a mere means, period. What it takes, in this context, to treat 
them also “as an end” thus becomes the question. If research 
participants had full information about their condition and have 
attained a full understanding of the nature and the risks of the 
procedures involved in the research, securing their informed consent 
to participation would probably suffice . . . . Research participants 
generally lack this full understanding. Further, as the case of 
incidental findings again shows, they enter studies lacking full 
knowledge about their own medical conditions . . . . Given the lack of 
                                                          
the researchers. See OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON ENGAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONS IN 
HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH (2008) [hereinafter GUIDANCE], available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/engage08.html. Similarly, OHRP provides that 
human sources are not human subjects at all for the purposes of research 
using biospecimens and data obtained from another institution and coded to 
prevent researchers from accessing any individually identifiable information. 
OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., GUIDANCE ON RESEARCH INVOLVING CODED PRIVATE INFORMATION OR 
BIOLOGICAL SPECIMENS (2008); 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2011). 
 3. For our purposes, informing a human subject’s physician or health 
care provider of the IF and allowing that health care provider with the 
professional relationship with the human source to decide whether and how to 
communicate the IF to the human source is the same as informing the human 
source of the IF. 
 4. Susan M. Wolf, Jordan Paradise & Charlisse Caga-anan, The Law of 
Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Establishing Researchers’ 
Duties, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 361, 362 (2008). 
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full information and given the huge average asymmetry in knowledge 
and understanding between the researchers on the one side and 
research participants on the other, we should conclude that the 
procedural safeguard of informed consent does not ensure that 
research participants are treated “also as ends.”5 
  We reject this position [that investigators have no obligations] in 
favor of the view that investigators do have limited obligations to 
inform subjects of incidental health-related findings. There are at 
least three potential sources for such obligations . . . . First, if the 
investigator (or another on her research team) is a physician, these 
obligations might derive from the nature of a physician’s professional 
duties. Second, they might derive from duties rooted in general 
beneficence, independent of any professional or other relationship 
between the parties. Finally, and most persuasively, they might 
derive from the nature of professional responsibility generally or 
professional responsibility in the investigator-subject relationship. 
Considering these possibilities, it turns out, sheds light not only on 
investigators’ duties regarding incidental findings, but more 
fundamentally on the nature of the investigator-subject relationship 
itself.6 
An interest in controlling the use of one’s DNA that is 
grounded on human dignity need not adopt reductionist views 
about personhood or the relationship between DNA and 
identity. Particular uses of one’s DNA, in research or otherwise, 
may be viewed as thwarting the will of moral agents where 
such uses impede or undermine specific goals held by those 
agents. For instance, individuals may oppose research on the 
genetics of certain behavioral or other traits, like intelligence or 
sexual orientation. Individuals might additionally believe that 
DNA, including or especially human DNA, should not be 
patented. In the absence of control over one’s genetic material, 
however, researchers might well use an individual’s DNA to 
conduct such experiments, or to isolate, copy, and patent an 
interesting gene.7 
 Similar examples abound. Against this backdrop of 
ethical and legal inquiry, genetic and genomic research has 
continued to rapidly evolve from individual single-site studies 
                                                          
 5. Henry S. Richardson, Incidental Findings and Ancillary-Care 
Obligations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 256, 263 (2008). 
 6. Franklin G. Miller, Michelle M. Mello, & Steven Joffe, Incidental 
Findings in Human Subjects Research: What Do Investigators Owe Research 
Participants?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 271, 272 (2008). 
 7. Natalie Ram, Assigning Rights and Protecting Interests: Constructing 
Ethical and Efficient Legal Rights in Human Tissue Research, 23 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 119, 125–26 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
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into large-scale, high-yield, and, in a number of cases, high-
profit enterprises.8 These enterprises are supported 
increasingly by the rise of the so-called “biobank research 
system” in which human specimens and data containing DNA 
information are amassed from multiple primary collection sites, 
including clinical (i.e., hospitals) and primary research sources, 
and archived by large-scale biobanks for downstream use by 
secondary researchers. In 1999, the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission (NBAC) reported that almost 300 million 
human biological specimens were being stored in the United 
States with over 20 million new specimens added annually.9 
Research conducted on these stored specimens and on DNA 
information derived from these specimens is often subject to 
federal oversight regulations, including most prominently the 
Department of Health and Human Services’ (DHHS) Common 
Rule10 and similar Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
regulations11 governing conduct in human subjects research 
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA)12 imposing data security standards and limiting the 
research use and disclosure of certain types of health 
information.13 
                                                          
 8. See, e.g., Steve Silberman, The Flesh Files, WIRED, June 2010, at 159, 
available at http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/05/ff_biobanks/all/1 (“From 
drug development to assisted reproduction, progress in dozens of fields would 
be impossible without biobanks. They are the biological back end of data-
driven medicine.”). We also recognize that a number of academic or clinical 
researchers are increasingly dependent on biobank research systems for 
research grants, publications, tenure, and professional standing. See, e.g., 
Greg Blackman, Biobanking: Saving for the Future, SCI. COMPUTING WORLD, 
Apr./May 2009, available at http://www.scientific-
computing.com/features/feature.php?feature_id=232 (“[I]n a pharmaceutical or 
biotechnology environment, biobanks are used to store specimen data in 
support of clinical trials. . . . In a medical research institute, while the clinical 
trial context may also apply, the primary focus of a biobank is to serve 
Principle Investigators (PIs), which could be clinicians or PhD researchers.”). 
 9. 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN 
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 13 (1999). 
 10. 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2011). 
 11. 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56 (2011). 
 12. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 5, 18, 28, 29, 
42, 44, 45). 
 13. Other regulatory requirements may also be pertinent to biobank 
research activities, including the Privacy Act. Regulatory requirements under 
these regimes are, for the purposes of this paper, largely similar to those 
raised under HIPAA and, thus, are not discussed in detail. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A 
§ 552(a) (West, 2012). 
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Under the Common Rule, researchers must typically 
obtain approval from a local Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
prior to commencing human subjects research.14 The IRB 
approval must be based on a demonstration that the risks to 
human subjects associated with the research are minimized 
and are reasonable in relation to any anticipated benefits.15 
The Common Rule also requires that researchers obtain 
informed consent from human subjects for specific research 
activities based on explicit disclosures of research risks and 
benefits.16 HIPAA similarly requires authorization from 
individuals before researchers can use or disclosure certain 
health information in the course of research.17 
However, existing federal provisions and exclusions to 
these regulatory schemes allow researchers to avoid these 
requirements for IRB approval and informed 
consent/authorization by using existing specimen and data and 
recording information in a manner that prevents  their human 
sources from being identified18 or by using existing specimen 
and data that have already been deidentified or stripped of 
their individual identifiers.19 The primary basis for these 
provisions and exclusions is that the only harms human 
sources face as a result of research using their specimens and 
data are those associated with privacy and the risk of 
identification,20 and that deidentification effectively 
                                                          
 14. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2011). 
 15. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1)–(2) (2011). 
 16. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2011). 
 17. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1). 
 18. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2012); GUIDANCE, supra note 2. 
 19. See GUIDANCE, supra note 2. One can debate whether it is possible to 
ever actually de-identify biospecimens as it is possible to match DNA 
information extracted from a specimen to other available individually 
identifying information. DNA matching is essentially 100% accurate and much 
less likely to lead to errors as can happen with similar names or dates of birth. 
The rise of biobanks storing DNA information makes it increasingly easy to 
link that DNA information with DNA information extracted from 
biospecimens for identification purposes. For purposes of this article, we do 
not address whether DNA information can ever be truly de-identified. 
 20. See Greg Helgesson et al., Ethical Framework for Previously Collected 
Biobank Samples, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 973, 973 (2007) (“Having a 
biological sample stored in a biobank involves no direct physical risk to the 
donor once the sample has been obtained.”); see also Human Subjects Research 
Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing 
Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,513–14 (July 
26, 2011) [hereinafter ANPRM] (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164 
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“minimize[s] the risk of harm to individuals while maximizing 
benefit [from research] to the broader society.”21 Thus, 
according to this view, deidentification avails the human source 
of the same rights protected by the Common Rule and the IRB 
process.22 Alternatively, these provisions and exclusions can be 
viewed as allowing deidentification to eliminate the regulatory 
obligations of researchers to individuals who would otherwise 
be regarded as human subjects and afforded rights under the 
regime of human subjects research protection.23 
Asaconsequence, some biobanks deliberately and permanently 
de-identify specimens and data prior to sharing them with 
downstream secondary researchers so that no obligations to 
human sources may exist.24 The result is that secondary 
researchers may not have any contact with the human sources 
and may not know or be able to determine the sources’ 
identities. Furthermore, human sources may be completely 
unaware that their specimens and data have been archived and 
are being used for secondary research or any research at all. 
Adding to this already complex picture is the potential for 
secondary research to turn up IFs of potential clinical 
significance to human sources. Questions loom as to what 
duties biobanks and secondary researchers have to disclose 
such IFs to human sources, and how such disclosures can even 
                                                          
and 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56) (“[I]ncreasing use of genetic information, existing 
(i.e., stored) biospecimens, medical records, and administrative claims data in 
research has changed the nature of the risks and benefits of research 
participation. Risks related to these types of research are not physical but 
informational (e.g., resulting from the unauthorized release of information 
about subjects”). 
 21. Jill Pulley et al., Principles of Human Subjects Protections Applied in 
an Opt-Out, De-identified Biobank, 3 CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 42, 45 
(2010). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See, e.g., Katherine Drabiak-Syed, State Codification of Federal 
Regulatory Ambiguities in Biobanking and Genetic Research, 30 J. LEGAL 
MED. 299, 304 (2009) (“Currently, institutions may broadly collect specimens 
that have no accompanying identifying information to use for anonymized 
research without notification or obtaining a patient’s consent. Ambiguity in 
federal law allows the possibility for institutions to build a biobank, by 
collecting leftover specimens and coded annotated information outside the 
scope of the Privacy Rule, to conduct genetic research without regulation or 
oversight.”). 
 24. One such biobank is Vanderbilt University’s BioVU. See Pulley et al., 
supra note 21, at 45; BioVU: Vanderbilt’s DNA Databank, VANDERBILT UNIV., 
http://dbmi.mc.vanderbilt.edu/research/dnadatabank.html (last visited Apr. 
20, 2012). 
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take place when it may be difficult or impossible to reidentify 
sources and when sources never consented to and are unaware 
of their involvement in research in the first place. 
If at this point the reader is thinking that this multiplex of 
issues necessitates additional ethical and legal deliberation 
about the rights of human sources and the duties of biobanks 
and researchers, we have news for you—the issues are on the 
table but may be in the throes of what we see as a type of broad 
regulatory failure. We define this failure much like other forms 
of non-market failure where government policies produce 
ineffective results or distortions that undermine their very 
purpose.25 We choose the term broad regulatory failure rather 
than government failure because the problem we describe 
involves not only formal oversight agencies such as DHHS and 
FDA, but also institutional oversight bodies like IRBs as well 
as complementary sources of oversight like standards of 
practice adopted by biobank research entities including 
primary collection sites (i.e., hospitals and primary 
researchers), biobanks, and secondary researchers.26 As 
explained by Natalie Ram: 
For both researchers and society at large, simple and inexpensive 
access to the raw materials of research is critical to promoting 
investment in science and medicine. Researchers and those who fund 
research have a strong interest in minimizing roadblocks to research. 
Where there are fewer permissions to obtain, research can proceed 
more quickly and with less cost . . . . The addition and protection of 
more rigorous consent or other requirements designed to facilitate 
provider control over the use, disclosure, and commercialization of 
tissue may exacerbate these problems.27 
Given the administrative burdens and delays to research 
that can result from requirements for informed consent and 
IRB review, biobank research entities have considerable 
incentive to take advantage of favorable interpretations of 
existing regulatory exclusions and exemptions provided under 
the Common Rule and HIPAA by deidentifying specimens and 
data and, thus, making reidentification of sources for the 
                                                          
 25. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulation and Failure, in NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 11–23 (David Moss and John Cisternino eds., 
2009); Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less 
Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARVARD L. REV. 547 (1979). 
 26. As discussed in more detail below, state law requirements have not 
been addressed in prior analysis. 
 27. Ram, supra note 7, at 137–38. 
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purposes of disclosing IFs a moot point. IRBs, which are 
frequently cited as being chronically overextended,28 have 
similar incentives to avoid advocating for disclosure of IFs from 
secondary research as this would add considerably to the 
number of protocols they would have to review and approve, 
increase the complexity of questions they would have to 
address in rendering such approvals, and place them in a 
position where they would retain complex oversight 
responsibilities for future secondary research. 
In the summer of 2011, DHHS published an Advanced 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) to amend the 
Common Rule in light of recent advances that have changed 
the nature of biomedical research.29 As justification for these 
proposed changes, DHHS cites the increasingly immense 
volume of and expenditures for biomedical research30 and 
argues that risks  to human participants in research using 
stored specimens and data are exclusively limited to 
informational risks associated with unauthorized disclosure of 
private information and do not include any physical, 
psychological, or other types of risks.31 Thus, the ANPRM is not 
only silent on the issue of IFs arising from biobank research, 
but proposes amendments to the Common Rule that would 
encourage broader and more irreversible deidentification 
practices that, in essence, substantially reduce or eliminate (1) 
any rights of human sources to receive IFs; (2) any researcher 
obligations regarding return of IFs; (3) any researcher 
obligations to obtain specific informed consent for research 
using genetic information; and (4) any meaningful regulatory 
oversight of secondary research using biospecimens and DNA 
information obtained from biobanks.32 
The good news for those concerned by this potential 
regulatory failure—and, perhaps, the bad news for those 
favoring status quo outcomes—is that federal law is not the 
                                                          
 28. See, e.g., Lura Abbott and Christine Grady, A Systematic Review of the 
Empirical Literature Evaluating IRBs: What We Know and What We Still 
Need to Learn, 6 J. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH & HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS 3, 3 
(2011); C. K. Gunsalus et al., Mission Creep in the IRB World, 321 SCIENCE 
1441, 1441 (2006). 
 29. ANPRM, supra note 20, at 44,51a2. 
 30. Id. at 44,513 
 31. Id. at 44,513–14. 
 32. At the time of this paper, the final rule amending the Common Rule 
has not been adopted. As such, we analyze the draft rule while recognizing 
that there may be changes. 
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supreme word dictating the outcome of complex biobank 
research issues. Indeed, many complex legal and ethical issues 
posed by biobank research, including issues of ownership of 
specimens and data, retention and use of archived specimens 
and data, genetic privacy, and informed consent, are already 
being and will likely continue to be decided not by federal and 
institutional authorities, but by state laws which to-date have 
not been federally preempted. 
This is not some idle possibility. A number of recent 
judicial decisions reveal that researchers in full compliance 
with federal regulations may be subject to liability under state 
laws imposing higher informed consent and disclosure 
requirements.33 Furthermore, because of the great variability of 
requirements across different states, biobank research 
activities that involve primary collection sites, secondary 
researchers, and human sources from different states likely 
face a formidable patchwork of laws under which they may face 
liability, as well as jurisdictions in which they can be sued. 
In this paper, we explore what we think is the likely 
outcome for biobank research entities that choose to avoid 
disclosures of IFs but which are in full compliance with federal 
regulations. While disclosures of IFs are our central focus, we 
direct significant attention to the issue of informed consent as 
an unsettled and central element underpinning concerns with 
all rights and responsibilities arising under the biobank 
research system. In part I, we describe the enforcement and 
limits of IF disclosures from biobanks and secondary research 
under current and proposed federal regulatory requirements. 
In part II, we further describe the broad regulatory failure 
which may be taking place at the federal and institutional 
levels. In part III, we describe how the enforcement and 
limitations IF disclosures from biobanks and secondary 
research might play out in state courts. Finally, in part IV, we 
offer our points of consideration to biobanks, researchers, and 
state, federal, and institutional oversight authorities concerned 
with the eventual outcome of how rights and limits to IF 
disclosures will be enforced. 
 
                                                          
 33. See, e.g., Bearder v. State of Minnesota, 806 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 2011) 
(holding that the Minnesota Department of Health violated Minnesota’s 
Genetic Privacy Act). 
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I. ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS AND LIMITS OF IF 
DISCLOSURES UNDER CURRENT AND PROPOSED 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
The biobank research system is subject to federal human 
subjects research regulations most prominently codified under 
the DHHS Common Rule34 and similar FDA regulations for 
human subjects protection,35 as well as to federal privacy 
regulations under HIPAA.36 These regulations attach to specific 
entities within the biobank research system, including 
collection sites, biobanks themselves, and secondary 
researchers, depending on the nature of the entities and the 
activities they undertake. While these federal regulations, both 
as they currently exist and under proposed changes put forth 
by the ANPRM, are silent on the issue of IFs, they do provide 
the framework by which we can assess when and how IF 
disclosures could take place. 
The Common Rule “applies to all research involving 
human subjects conducted, supported or otherwise subject to 
regulation” by fifteen federal departments and agencies,37 as 
well as to research by any institution claiming Federalwide 
Assurance (FWA) for the protection of human subjects by 
adopting the standards and rules articulated in the Common 
Rule.38 FDA regulations for human subjects protection apply to 
all clinical investigations regulated by or in support of 
applications for research and approvals for products regulated 
by the FDA.39 Both the Common Rule and FDA rules for 
human subjects protection typically require researchers to 
obtain informed consent from human subjects and approval 
from an IRB prior to commencing human subjects research.40 
                                                          
 34. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2011). 
 35. 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56 (2011). 
 36. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat, 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 37. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2011); see also Federal Policy for the Protection of 
Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/index.html (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2012). 
 38. Federalwide Assurance (FWA) for the Protection of Human Subjects, 
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/assurances/assurances/filasurt.html (last updated 
June 17, 2011). 
 39. 21 C.F.R. § 50.1 (2011). 
 40. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109, 46.116 (2011); 21 C.F.R. pt. 50, (a)–(B) (2011). 
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Requirements for IRB review and approval under both the 
Common Rule and FDA rules direct IRBs to evaluate ethical 
concerns posed based on assessments of several key factors 
including: minimization of risks to human subjects; 
reasonability of risks in relation to anticipated benefits, if any; 
adequacy of informed consent; sufficiency of data monitoring; 
and protection of human subjects’ privacy and the 
confidentiality of data.41 Informed consent is generally required 
for the specific research being conducted and, absent unusual 
situations, research participants can withdraw from the 
research at any time, for any reason, and without penalty.42 
While these regulations do not provide a concrete definition 
of “risk,” guidance for IRBs has identified risks to subjects as 
including physical, psychological, economic, and social risks.43 
Concerns associated with subjects’ privacy and confidentiality 
of data have been framed as a set of issues separate from these 
other risks. These concerns pertain to subjects’ informed 
consent to entrust investigators with access to their private 
information and the associated responsibility of investigators to 
safeguard that private information from unauthorized access.44 
Stated differently, the federal regulatory system, including the 
use of IRBs as an oversight mechanism, requires consideration 
of, and protection of research subjects from, three core risks or 
concerns: (1) unconsented research, (2) excessive or 
inappropriate risk, and (3) disclosure of confidential 
information (primarily health related information). The 
satisfaction of one factor does not eliminate the need to satisfy 
the other factors. 
The extent to which IFs comprise risks of concern to IRBs 
has been the topic of much debate. As explained by Wolf et al.: 
For a research participant recruited as a normal control, discovery of 
an IF suggesting pathology may trigger anxiety, burdens, and the 
costs of further evaluation to verify or rule out a clinical problem. 
Even research participants with known pathology risk discovery of an 
unrelated IF, triggering the same. . .. [S]ome IFs will lead to 
                                                          
 41. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2011); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111 (2011). 
 42. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (2011); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(8) (2011). There 
are some complex withdrawal issues associated with implanted medical 
devices that are not relevant to this discussion. 
 43. Institutional Review Board Guidebook, Chapter III: Basic IRB Review, 
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb_chapter3.htm#e1 (last updated 1993). 
 44. Id. 
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diagnoses of clinical importance. . . For such a research participant, 
taking part in the study imposes both the risk of discovering an IF 
and potential benefit of discovering serious pathology in time to 
intervene. 45 
Proponents of including IFs as a category of risk to subjects 
argue that minimizing risks and reasonably balancing risks 
and benefits requires that investigators and IRBs evaluate 
whether: (1) a research protocol has the potential to produce 
IFs of clinical significance to subjects; (2) whether the protocol 
provides adequate procedures for addressing when and how IFs 
will be disclosed to subjects; and (3) whether informed consent 
documents adequately inform subjects about the risks and 
benefits of IFs, as well as whether and when they can expect IF 
disclosures.46 Pursuant to this analysis, several commentators, 
including groups such as the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission, National Institute of Health’s (NIH) National 
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention have put forth recommendations for 
investigators and IRBs on how to identify and evaluate the 
adequacy of plans to address IFs arising from research.47 
Quite importantly, these recommendations have focused 
almost exclusively on IFs arising in the course of primary 
research in which IRB review and informed consent are de 
facto requirements under both federal and state law.48 
Secondary research adds further complexity to issues of IF 
disclosure and informed consent given that the research being 
performed may well not even be conceived of at the time that 
consent is obtained. However, these analyses have not 
generally been applied to biobank research entities including 
collection sites, biobanks themselves, and secondary 
researchers using archived specimens and DNA data from 
biobanks for several reasons. 
                                                          
 45. Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human 
Subjects Research: Analysis and Recommendation, 36 J. LAW MED. ETHICS, 
219, 227 (2008). 
 46. 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 9, at 72. 
 47. Id.; Laura M. Beskow et al., Informed Consent for Population-Based 
Research Involving Genetics, 286 JAMA 2315, 2320 (2001); Robert R. Fabsitz 
et al., Ethical and Practical Guidelines for Reporting Genetic Research Results 
to Study Participants: Updated Guidelines from a National Heart, Lung, and 
Blood Institute Working Group, 3 CIRCULATION: CARDIOVASCULAR GENETICS 
574 (2010), available at http://circgenetics.ahajournals.org/ 
content/3/6/574.long; see Consensus Report, supra note 1, at Figure 5 for a full 
roster of recommendations on returning IFs. 
 48. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109, 46.116 (2011). 
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First, the Common Rule and FDA rules only apply to 
instances of human subjects research.49 In the context of 
primary research, the collection of specimens and data is 
specifically for the purposes of the research in question and 
involves direct contact with human subjects, easily bringing 
collection activities under the gambit of requirements for 
informed consent and IRB review. In the context of the biobank 
research system, however, specimens and data may be initially 
collected for non-research purposes, such as when physicians 
obtain biological materials (e.g., blood or tissue samples) or 
health information in the course of clinical diagnosis or 
treatment.50 Neither the Common Rule nor the FDA rules 
apply to such clinical collections at the time of collection. The 
application of the Common Rule and similar FDA requirements 
to the subsequent secondary use, including, for example, 
situations in which the non-regulated collected specimens or 
data are subsequently sent to a biobank or used for secondary 
research, is unclear. Even if the initial collection of biobanked 
specimens and data is research purposed (i.e., collected for 
primary research), current federal regulations may not (and, 
most often, do not) require primary researchers to obtain IRB 
review or informed consent for any downstream secondary 
research not yet conceived of that might use the collected 
specimens or data.51 Those obligations, if they arise, will fall on 
the secondary researcher once he develops his research 
protocol. Furthermore, aggregation and archiving of specimens 
and data are not in and of themselves considered to be research 
activities under the Common Rule and FDA regulations.52 
Consequently, under this view, biobanks do not need IRB 
                                                          
 49. 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 50, 56 (2011). 
 50. See, e.g., NUgene, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, 
https://www.nugene.org/ (last updated Oct 5, 2010) (Northwestern University 
NUgene biobank that “collects and stores genetic (DNA) samples along with 
associated healthcare information from patients of Northwestern-affiliated 
hospitals and clinics.”). 
 51. The applicability of the Common Rule and FDA requirements to 
secondary research has been debated with differing views. While we may 
conclude that certain of these federal requirements are applicable to secondary 
research, that analysis is outside of the scope of this article. We instead focus 
on state law requirements. 
 52. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OHRP - GUIDANCE ON 
RESEARCH INVOLVING CODED PRIVATE INFORMATION OR BIOLOGICAL 
SPECIMENS (2004) [herinafter OHRP GUIDANCE] (providing guidance as to 
when use of human specimens is or is not considered research). 
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approval or informed consent to engage in these activities. 
Second, where biobanks and secondary researchers are 
engaged in research, these research activities often are viewed 
as falling outside the scope of the Common Rule or as 
qualifying for categorical exemptions to Common Rule 
requirements for IRB review and informed consent. The 
Common Rule definition of human subject is “a living 
individual about whom an investigator . . . conducting research 
obtains (1) [d]ata through intervention or interaction with the 
individual, or (2) [i]dentifiable private information.”53 The 
Common Rule further clarifies that private information “must 
be individually identifiable” such that “the identity of the 
subject is or may readily be ascertained by the investigator or 
associated with the information.”54 By contrast, the FDA rules 
define a human subject as “an individual [either healthy or a 
patient] who is or becomes a participant in research, either as a 
recipient of the test article or as a control”55 without 
consideration for direct interaction or identifiability of 
information by the investigator.  Thus, while the FDA rules do 
not allow for waiver of IRB requirements based on the 
identifiability of specimens and data,56 the (current) Common 
Rule does include certain exclusions and exemptions that apply 
to a large portion of biobank research activities. 
Guidance from the Office of Human Research Protections 
(OHRP) provides that research involving deidentified 
specimens or data that were either not collected for the 
purposes of the research in question57 or obtained from another 
institute is not human subjects research at all and is excluded 
altogether from the Common Rule’s jurisdiction.58 The Common 
                                                          
 53. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2011). 
 54. Id. 
 55. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 (2011). 
 56. FDA does, however, allow for waiver of informed consent 
requirements in certain circumstances. CTR. FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL 
HEALTH, GUIDANCE ON INFORMED CONSENT FOR IN VITRO DIAGNOSTIC DEVICE 
STUDIES USING LEFTOVER HUMAN SPECIMENS THAT ARE NOT INDIVIDUALLY 
IDENTIFIABLE (2006) (providing notice that the FDA “intends to exercise 
enforcement discretion” when, inter alia, “[t]he study uses leftover specimens”; 
“[t]he specimens are not individually identifiable”; “[t]he specimens are 
provided to the investigator(s) without identifiers”; “[t]he individuals caring 
for the patients are different from, and do not share information [with those] 
conducting the investigation”; and “[t]he study has been reviewed by an IRB . . 
. .”). 
 57. OHRP GUIDANCE, supra note 52. 
 58. Id. 
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Rule itself also includes a categorical exemption from IRB 
review and informed consent requirements for “[r]esearch 
involving the collection or study of existing data . . . 
pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if . . . the 
information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner 
that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through 
identifiers linked to the subjects.”59 Consequently, biobanks 
and secondary researchers can arguably avoid the Common 
Rule-based IRB review and informed consent requirements by 
either obtaining specimens or data that are already 
deidentified or by separating such specimens and data from 
their identifying information prior to commencing research. 
Furthermore, even in some instances where secondary research 
involves existing but identifiable specimens and data, federal, 
Common Rule-based requirements for informed consent may 
potentially be satisfied if the original collection site obtained 
general consent for future research or if the original consent is 
found to be compatible with the secondary research use.60 
A third source of regulatory authority pertinent to the 
biobank research system is HIPAA, which applies only to 
“covered entities” including health care plans, health care 
clearinghouses, and health care providers that transfer health 
information in electronically.61 HIPAA restricts how covered 
entities may use or disclose protected health information (PHI), 
including information linked to biological samples62 that 
                                                          
 59. 45 CFR 46.101(b)(4) (2011). A key note here is that, unlike the 
excluded categories of non-human subjects research defined by OHRP, this 
exempt category of research is subject to the final authority of DHHS and 
agency heads for determining whether the requirements for the exemption are 
in fact satisfied. 45 CFR 46.01(c) & (d) (2011). 
 60. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FAQS, TERMS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON INFORMED CONSENT AND RESEARCH USE OF 
BIOSPECIMENS: THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH 
PROTECTIONS  (2010), available at  http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp/ 
commsec/attachmentdfaq’stermsandrecommendations.pdf (“The determination 
of whether a proposed secondary research use is compatible with the original 
consent will be context-specific based on a range of considerations. If the 
original consent form specifically prohibited the proposed research activity, it 
is presumed the research is not allowable. If the consent does not prohibit the 
proposed use, IRBs should consider several questions to determine 
compatibility . . . .”). 
 61. 45 C.F.R. § 164.104(a) (2011). 
 62. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2011). HIPAA does not otherwise bind to 
biological samples. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESEARCH 
REPOSITORIES, DATABASES, AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 11 (2004), 
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pertains to an individual’s current, past, or future health or 
health care and is either individually identifiable or provides a 
reasonable basis for individual re-identification.63 
HIPAA may apply to a range of biobank research entities, 
including clinical collection sites that provide health care at the 
time of collection and electronically transmit PHI to biobanks,64 
biobanks located at academic health centers or at hospitals,65 
and secondary researchers receiving PHI from biobanks that 
are covered entities.66 Because HIPAA defines PHI as 
individually identifiable, it does not regulate covered entities 
from using or disclosing deidentified health information as long 
as an expert using “generally accepted statistical and scientific 
principles and methods” can attest there is a “very small” risk 
of re-identification, or if the health information is stripped of 
eighteen specific identifiers provided under the regulation.67 
Covered entities may retain the code linking deidentified 
information to their identified source, but are prohibited under 
HIPAA from using or disclosing the code.68 If the code is used 
by a covered entity for re-identification, the information is 
reinstated as PHI and the covered entity is again subject to 
HIPAA requirements.69 In order to use or disclose PHI for 
research, a covered entity must first obtain authorization from 
the individual to whom the PHI is linked.70 This individual 
                                                          
available at http://privacyryleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/ 
research_repositories_final.pdf. 
 63. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2011). 
 64. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, RESEARCH REPOSITORIES, 
DATABASES, AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 62, at 1. 
 65. Id. (“Researchers are not themselves covered entities, unless they are 
also health care providers and engage in any of the covered electronic 
transactions. If, however, researchers are employees or other workforce 
members of a covered entity (e.g., a covered hospital or health insurer), they 
may have to comply with that entity’s HIPAA privacy policies and 
procedures.”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b) (2011). 
 68. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c). Under the Public Health Service Act, DHHS 
also has authority to issue certificates of confidentiality to any investigator 
conducting a study that requires IRB approval under the Common Rule when 
the study involves the identifiable information. However, while HIPAA 
prohibits covered entities from disclosing identifying information, certificates 
of confidentiality only provide investigators the legal right to refuse disclosure. 
They do not prohibit investigators from making voluntary disclosures. 42 
U.S.C. § 241 (2006). 
 69. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (2011). 
 70. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (2011). 
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authorization can be combined with informed consent required 
under the Common Rule or FDA regulations71 and must 
address the risk to the individual’s privacy posed by the 
authorized use or disclosure.72 
An important note is that HIPAA does not allow for 
general authorizations for future use and disclosure and, 
instead, always requires study-specific authorizations.73 As 
with the Common Rule, HIPAA also contains certain provisions 
that allow covered researchers to bypass its requirements. 
First, HIPAA includes a provision that allows covered entities 
to use or disclose identifiable PHI for research without 
individual authorization through the obtainment of a waiver of 
authorization from an IRB or institutional Privacy Board74 
based on the satisfaction of three criteria: (1) the research poses 
no more than minimal risk to the privacy of individuals, (2) the 
research could not practicably be conducted without the waiver, 
and (3) the research could not be practicably conducted without 
using PHI.75 Covered researchers can also avoid the need for 
individual authorizations by using a “limited data set”76 that 
contains certain demographic information about individuals in 
conjunction with a data use agreement that identifies 
permitted uses and disclosures of that information77 and bars 
the recipient of the limited-data set from identifying the 
information or contacting the individuals to whom the 
                                                          
 71. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3)(i). 
 72. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PROTECTING PERSONAL 
HEALTH INFORMATION IN RESEARCH: UNDERSTANDING THE HIPAA PRIVACY 
RULE 11 (Apr. 14, 2003), available at 
http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/HIPAA_Booklet_4-14-2003.pdf (“An 
authorization differs from an informed consent in that an Authorization 
focuses on privacy risks and states how, why, and to whom the PHI will be 
used and/or disclosed for research. An informed consent, on the other hand, 
provides research subjects with a description of the study, its anticipated risks 
and/or benefits, and a description of how the confidentiality of records will be 
protected, among other things.”). 
 73. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3); see also DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., FAQS, TERMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON INFORMED CONSENT AND 
RESEARCH USE OF BIOSPECIMENS: THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON 
HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, supra note 60 (indicating DHHS’ 
interpretation of HIPAA as requiring study-specific authorizations.). 
 74. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(1) (2011). 
 75. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii). 
 76. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2011). 
 77. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(4)(ii)(A) (2011). 
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information pertains.78 
The combined effect of these regulatory regimes is that 
biobank research entities can arguably avoid most if not all 
federal requirements for IRB review, informed consent, and 
individual authorization by de-identifying their specimens and 
data. The results with respect to IF disclosures are three-fold. 
First, there may be no opportunity for an IRB to evaluate 
whether the secondary research poses any risks or benefits 
associated with IFs. Second, disclosures of IFs may be 
impracticable or impossible depending on the extent to which 
re-identification is technically possible or legally allowable. 
Finally, even when disclosures of IFs remain a possibility, the 
very act of considering them for disclosure or identifying their 
sources may trigger an uncertain and complex web of 
regulatory requirements that includes certain preconditions 
(i.e., informed consent, IRB review, and individual 
authorization) to research that the researchers did not and, 
indeed, were not required to satisfy before they began doing the 
research. 
Proposed changes to this regulatory landscape as 
articulated in the ANPRM address some of the challenges 
raised by the biobank research system, but have an overall 
effect that further frustrates disclosures of IFs. In contrast to 
the claims stated above that IFs pose physical, psychological, 
and economic risks and benefits to human subjects, the 
ANPRM states that: 
[I]ncreasing use of genetic information, existing (i.e., stored) 
biospecimens, medical records, and administrative claims data in 
research has changed the nature of the risks and benefits of research 
participation. Risks related to these types of research are not physical 
but informational (e.g., resulting from the unauthorized release of 
information about subjects).79 
As such, the ANPRM argues for several proposed changes 
to current Common Rule requirements to address these 
information risks. The first set of changes are definitional and 
involve the adoption of HIPAA’s rigorous definitions for 
identifiable information, deidentified information, and limited-
data sets in place of the Common Rules current, less stringent 
definition for individually identifiable information. The 
ANPRM provides that, under these more rigorous definitions, 
“all research involving the primary collection of biospecimens 
                                                          
 78. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(4)(ii)(C)(5). 
 79. ANPRM, supra note 20, at 44,513–14. 
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as well as storage and secondary analysis of existing 
biospecimens [would be categorized] as research involving 
identifiable information.”80 This change stems from the 
ANPRM’s position that “[r]egardless of what information is 
removed, it is possible to extract DNA from a biospecimen itself 
and potentially link it to otherwise available data to identify 
individuals.”81 
For researchers using deidentified information or limited-
data sets, the ANPRM argues that mandatory data security 
standards, including provisions that “strictly [prohibit 
researchers] from attempting to re-identify the subjects of the 
information,”82 can provide better protection against 
informational risks and, thus, should replace IRB review of 
such concerns.83 Citing the increase reliance of investigators on 
third-party experts to remove identifiers instead of recording 
information in an un-identifiable manner themselves, the 
ANPRM also argues that “data could be considered deidentified 
or in a limited data set form even if investigators see the 
identification but do not record them in the permanent 
research file.”84 
The second set of changes pertains to informed consent. As 
stated by the ANPRM, under these revised rules “the allowable 
current practice of telling the subjects, during the initial 
research consent, that the data they are providing will be used 
for one purpose, and then stripping identifiers, allowing it to be 
used for a new purpose to which the subject never consented, 
would not be allowed.”85 The ANPRM further provides that 
these consent requirements can be satisfied in most cases at 
the time of the initial collection of specimens/data by having 
subjects sign a “brief general consent form allowing for broad, 
future research” or allowing the subject to reject future 
research. In instances requiring more specific consent, such as 
cell line or reproductive research, this initial consent form 
could provide check-boxes allowing subjects to opt in or out of 
                                                          
 80. Id. at 44,525. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 44,526. 
 83. Id. Note that this portion of the ANPRM did not address the return of 
IFs. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 44,519. 
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these particular types of research.86 
The proposed rules would require informed consent for all 
biospecimens and identifiable data regardless of whether 
originally collected for research or non-research purposes, but 
allow for that consent to be acquired at the time of initial 
collection. For research on limited data sets and deidentified 
data, informed consent would be required unless the data was 
originally collected for a non-research purpose. Perhaps 
paradoxically, the approach proposed in the ANPRM provides 
less protection for those individuals who have the least 
knowledge that their biospecimens or health information will 
be used in research. It would seem that this category of 
“contributors” are entitled to at least some advance knowledge 
and ability to consent (or to withhold consent) before research 
is commenced using their specimens and information. Such 
consent as is proposed by the ANPRM could also be obtained at 
the time of the initial collection. The ANPRM states that these 
informed consent requirements would only apply prospectively 
to specimens/data collected after the adoption of the new rules. 
The third set of changes pertains to the nature of IRB 
review and the categories of research exempt from IRB review. 
While the current Common Rule provides that “[r]esearch 
involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, 
records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, . . . if 
the information is recorded by the investigator in a manner 
that subjects cannot be identified” is exempt from all 
requirements, these research studies would have to comply 
with new mandatory federal data security standards under the 
amended Common Rule. The ANPRM frames this change as 
“moving away from the concept of exempt [research studies]” to 
a category of research studies “excused” from IRB review. 87 
Because this shift increases protections for subjects beyond 
what is provided in the status quo, the ANPRM argues that the 
“excused” category can be expanded to include more types of 
studies than in the current “exempt” category.88 
Thus, the ANPRM proposes that the current exemption for 
research on pre-existing specimen/data be amended “to clarify 
that the word ‘existing’ means collected for purposes other than 
                                                          
 86. Note, however, that the ANPRM states that “[p]articipation in a 
research study (such as a clinical trial) could not be conditioned on agreeing to 
allow future open-ended research using a biospecimen.” Id. at 44,520. 
 87. Id. at 44,518. 
 88. Id. 
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the proposed research and not that all the data or biospecimens 
need exist that the time the study commenced.”89 Furthermore, 
the ANPRM proposes that the current limitation on 
investigators recording identifying information be eliminated 
“unless there are plans to provide individual results back to the 
subjects,” in which case the study would be ineligible for 
excused status altogether.90 
Research that does not qualify as excused under the 
amended Common Rule would still require review by a fully 
convened IRB. However, with the adoption of mandatory data 
security standards, IRBs would only assess the ethical 
dimensions of these research protocols, but would no longer be 
responsible for assessing their information risks.91 
Furthermore, while the current Common Rule requires IRBs to 
provide ongoing review of such research studies as a default, 
the ANPRM proposes that “[w]here the remaining activities in 
a study are limited to . . . data analysis (even if identifiers are 
retained) . . . , the default would be that no continuing review 
by an IRB would be required” unless the IRB decides that on-
going review is necessary.92 
To facilitate tracking and auditing of excused studies, 
researchers would be required to register these studies with an 
IRB using a brief (one page) form.93 This form, the ANPRM 
contends, would allow institutions to identify those rare 
instances where an excused study might require expedited or 
full IRB review.94 
Overall, the federal regulatory system provides substantial 
privacy protections for public disclosures of confidential 
personal health information, but limited research 
subject/contributor/source protection. In particular, the federal 
regulatory system provides limited informed consent 
requirements, which are particularly noticeable in situations in 
                                                          
 89. Id. at 44,519. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 44,516. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 44,520. 
 94. Id. (discussing how the implementation of the brief registration form 
would allow researchers to begin their work after filing and certain filings that 
did not meet the requirement for being “‘excused”‘ would be subjected to 
“comprehensive administrative review,” which would prevent each filer from 
having to go through this extensive process). 
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which the biospecimen or information is collected outside of a 
research context.95  The federal system also provides limited 
guidance on when and how to return IFs to human sources.96 
The role and responsibilities of secondary research is addressed 
only in passing.97 
This federal structure makes biobank based research more 
economical and efficient for the researchers but may well not 
address all of the ethical, medical, or legal rights or concerns of 
the human sources. 
II. REGULATORY FAILURE OF BIOBANK RESEARCH 
OVERSIGHT 
The issue of IF disclosures comprises only a subset of 
rights and interests of human sources that are implicated by 
biobank research. Indeed, the debate over IFs seems in many 
respects to presuppose that federal regulations adequately 
address many of the more fundamental issues raised by 
biobank research that we believe are either inadequately 
resolved or wholly unsettled as legal and ethical matters. These 
issues include: the status of human sources of biological 
samples and genetic information as human research subjects; 
the rights of human sources to decide whether and how their 
samples and information can be used by others with or without 
consent; the duties owed to human sources by those who collect, 
store, and conducting research on their samples and 
information; and the effect of deidentification on these various 
                                                          
 95. See id. at 44,523 (“Critics of the existing rules [for informed consent] 
have observed that the current requirements for informed consent for future 
research with pre-existing data and biospecimens are confusing and consume 
substantial amounts of researchers’’ and IRBs’’ time and resources. Under the 
Common Rule and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, if identifiers are removed, 
specimens and data that have been collected for purposes other than the 
proposed research can be used without any requirement for informed consent 
or a HIPAA authorization.”). 
 96. See, e.g., id. at 44,520 (seeking advice on providing human research 
subjects with more protection and asking “Currently some IRBs make 
determinations regarding whether clinical results should be returned to study 
participants. How should such determinations be made if the study now fits in 
the Excused category? Can standard algorithms be developed for when test 
results should be provided to participants and when they should not (e.g., if 
they can be clinically interpreted, they must be given to the participants?”)). 
 97. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2012) (“Research, involving the collection 
or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens, or 
diagnostic specimens, if these sources are publicly available or if the 
information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjects 
cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects.”). 
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rights and duties. 
It is our contention that these fundamental issues are not 
only inadequately handled by the current federal regulatory 
regime, but also that the observable practices of the biobank 
research system that are currently allowable under some 
interpretations of federal regulations as well as the recent 
actions of the federal regulatory authorities, including the 
ANPRM, are indicative of a potential regulatory failure in 
which the very rights that are supposed to be protected by 
federal regulations are instead being undermined. It is not our 
intention to assign blame for this regulatory failure, but to 
bring attention to what we see as a rapidly emerging 
dissonance between the letter of the federal law and bioethical 
concerns, state oversight of research, human source 
expectations, and the spirit with which the federal oversight 
system was initially created. 
Federal human subjects research regulations were 
developed in large part because of well documented failures of 
researchers and oversight systems, both within the United 
States and outside of the United States, to protect human 
subjects.98  The rights of research subjects and the duties of 
researchers were not as historically and widely addressed by 
principles of common law as those that exist in the context of 
the physician-patient relationship.99 The Twentieth Century 
saw the rise of structured, complex human subject research 
projects and the corresponding rise of the academic, 
government, and private research industry.100 Much of this 
                                                          
 98. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH FUNDED OR REGULATED BY U.S. 
GOVERNMENT: HOW TODAY’S RULES PROHIBIT ETHICAL ABUSES IN HUMAN 
SUBJECTS RESEARCH (2010), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ 
1946inoculationstudy/information_on_protection_of_human_subjects_in_resea
rch.pdf (detailing the history and development of federal human subjects 
research protections); see also Donald H.J. Hermann, Lessons Taught By Miss 
Evers’ Boys: The Inadequacy Of Benevolence And The Need For Legal 
Protection Of Human Subjects In Medical Research, 15 J. L. & HEALTH 
147,147 (2000) (summarizing the Tuskegee Syphilis Study). 
 99. See Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 363 (“Clinicians owe patients a duty of 
care, which if breached, exposes clinicians to malpractice liability. 
Researchers, on the other hand, have until very recently been held to owe 
research participants few, if any, duties of clinical care enforceable in tort or 
contract law.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 100. See generally Adam H. Laughton, Somewhere to Run, Somewhere to 
Hide?: International Regulation of Human Subject Experimentation, 18 DUKE 
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research was federally funded, federally directed, or federally 
mandated.101 There was a parallel rise in the rights of patients 
and human research subjects to control their care or 
participation in research and their rights to information. 
Federal regulatory systems were created to address research 
conduct, particularly when conducted using federal funds.102 
These federal regulatory systems did not, however, replace 
other common law, statutory, or regulatory protections at the 
state, federal, or international levels.103 
As such, federal regulations governing human subjects 
research can best be regarded as establishing the minimum 
rights and duties arising from the research context. Research 
subjects may well be afforded more protections under common 
law principles of contracts and any additional rights they have 
under state or common law. Indeed, the very language of the 
Common Rule and similar FDA requires for informed consent 
provides that: 
No informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any 
exculpatory language through which the [research] subject . . . is 
made to waive any of the subject’s legal rights, or releases or appears 
to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution, or its agents 
from liability for negligence.104 
The legal rights referenced in the Common Rule include 
rights to bring product liability suits and to assert medical 
malpractice or privacy violations—many of which are state law 
based.105 
Similarly, the decentralization approach of using IRBs as 
an additional oversight system to evaluate and approve 
                                                          
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 181, 181–91 (discussing the historical development of 
human research and corresponding regulations). 
 101. See, e.g., id. at 185–87 (highlighting several controversial 20th 
Century American research studies conducted with human subjects and the 
U.S. government’s role in those studies). 
 102. See id. at 187 (“The revelation of the Tuskegee experiments resulted 
in the passage of the National Research Act in 1974, which created the 
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research. In 1979, the Commission published the Belmont Report 
which identified ‘basic ethical principles’ and applications of those principles 
that were relevant to human subject research. The recommendations of the 
Belmont Report were adopted by the Department of Health and Human 
Services and many other federal agencies and incorporated into their 
regulations. These recommendations evolved into what is currently known as 
the ‘Common Rule’ for human research protection.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 103. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(e)–(g) (2011). 
 104. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2011); 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2011). 
 105. Id. 
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research protocols on the basis of minimization and 
reasonability of risk, adequacy of informed consent, protection 
of privacy, and other standards set forth in the Common Rule 
and similar FDA rules is designed to allow for additional 
consideration of state and institutional requirements beyond 
those established under federal law.106 
The potential regulatory failure that we identify is one in 
which these federal regulations are being approached as the 
ceiling for rights and duties rather than as the floor. 
Furthermore, through some process that we do not attempt to 
diagnose, these federal regulations appear to be increasingly 
moving in the direction of providing fewer and fewer 
protections for research subjects, especially in the area of 
research using genetic specimens and data. This is evidenced 
both by the relaxation of informed consent and IRB review 
requirements proposed in the recent ANPRM and by recent 
draft guidance from OHRP and FDA on exculpatory language 
in informed consent which states that: 
[A] subject’s waiver of any rights he or she may have with respect to a 
biospecimen obtained by investigators for research purposes would 
not be exculpatory because it does not have the effect of freeing the 
investigator, sponsor, institution, or others involved in the research 
from malpractice, negligence, blame, fault, or guilt.107 
While the explanatory discussion of this draft guidance 
states that “[s]uch language may be considered an acceptable 
way to accurately inform subjects that they will not be 
receiving any financial compensation, now or in the future, for 
the use of those biospecimens,”108 the examples of acceptable 
informed consent language listed in the draft guidance go far 
beyond waivers of financial interest and include “I voluntarily 
and freely donate any and all blood, urine, and tissue samples 
to the [name of research institution] and hereby relinquish all 
property rights, title, and interest I may have in those 
samples”109 and “[b]y consenting to participate in this research, 
I give up any property rights I may have in bodily fluids or 
                                                          
 106. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a)–(b) (2011); 21 C.F.R. § 56.109(a)–(b) (2011). 
 107. OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROT. & FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
GUIDANCE ON EXCULPATORY LANGUAGE IN INFORMED CONSENT 2 (draft 
guidance) (2011), available at  http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM271036.pdf. 
 108. Id. at 2–3. 
 109. Id. at 3. 
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tissue samples collected during this research.”110 
The most significant concern with this situation—one 
which, as far as we know, has not previously been identified—is 
that the biobank research system, still nascent in most regards, 
is looking to these waning protections as unilaterally 
establishing the maximum or totality of the duties and 
standards of care by which it can operate.111 This concern is no 
better illustrated than with the issue of IFs arising from 
research using biobanked specimens and data. 
While the issue of IFs arising from the biobank research 
system is fairly new, many commentators have discussed in 
recent years the issue of what to do with IFs arising in the 
course of primary research. In 2008, Wolf et al. provided a 
comprehensive analysis of legal and ethical sources 
establishing researchers’ duties to consider and manage IFs 
arising in the course of their research. Looking at ethical 
sources, the authors found support for such duties based on 
notions of beneficence and reciprocity between researchers and 
research participants,112 concern for participants’ welfare,113 
and respect for participants’ autonomy.114 Looking at the source 
of duties arising under federal regulations, the authors argue 
that in order to satisfy their regulatory mandate to minimize 
risks to human subjects and maintain reasonable balance 
                                                          
 110. Id. 
 111. Drabiak-Syed raises a related point, stating: 
Despite some prescriptive requirements [provided under the Common 
Rule and HIPAA for the collection, storage, and research use of 
biospecimens from biobanks], the federal law fails to adequately 
protect individuals’ interest from unwanted collection and use of their 
tissues for genetic research as a result of ambiguity and liming the 
applicability of federal regulation to situations of direct identifiability. 
Several state legislatures have magnified these loopholes in federal 
regulation, codifying sweeping unregulated exceptions to promote 
medical and scientific research  advancement. 
Drabiak-Syed, supra note 23, at 229. 
 112. Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 365 (“Relying on the ethical duty of 
reciprocity suggests that researchers ‘incur obligations to help or benefit 
[research participants] in part because [researchers] have received or will 
receive assistance from [those participants]’”) (footnotes omitted). 
 113. Id. at 365–66 (citing arguments that research participants trust 
researchers to observe abnormal findings of significance and that researchers’ 
discretion to share such information is key to participants’ well-beings given 
the vulnerable position of participants). 
 114. Id. at 366 (“Respect for persons includes a respect for participants’ 
self-determination and consequent need for information relevant to their 
health and well-being . . . .”). 
006 FATEHI HALL_PROOF - SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012  1:16 PM 
602 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13:2 
 
 
between risks and benefits, researchers and IRBs must address 
how IFs will be handled.115 They state: 
Whenever individuals participate in genetic, genomic, or imaging 
research, they risk discovery of an IF. Finding out about an IF may 
impose psychological burden, the financial burden of follow-up 
assessment, and risk of bad sequelae from the follow-up tests. . . . Yet 
there is also a risk that researchers will fail to notice an IF of high 
clinical importance, and research participants will thus lose a chance 
to avoid or ameliorate serious clinical consequences. . . . The 
regulatory duty to minimize all of these risks suggests the obligation 
to create a solid plan to address IFs in the course of research.116 
Wolf et al. also argue that Common Rule requirements for 
informed consent disclosures, including disclosures of 
foreseeable benefits and risks and disclosures of findings 
developed over the course of research that may affect 
participants’ choice to continue their participation, all point 
toward IRBs requiring that IFs be discussed in the informed 
consent process.117 Finally, looking at sources of researchers’ 
duties arising under state common law, Wolf et al. find that 
there may be sufficient basis to regard a failure to disclosure an 
IF as a breach of the duty of care owed by a researcher to a 
research subject.118 As previously mentioned, based on this and 
other commentary, several organizations have produced 
recommendations for the management of IFs arising in the 
course of research.119 
So why then, in light of all the compelling arguments and 
support in favor of addressing IFs arising from primary 
research as part of researchers’ ethical and legal duties, is the 
disclosure of IFs from secondary research being disincentivized 
by federal regulations? The answer may be found in the 
following illustrative hypothetical offered by Ellen Wright 
Clayton for how an IF disclosure from genetic research using 
archived DNA might play out: 
You were a patient at Hospital A several years ago when you were 
suffering from disease X, which has long since resolved. You have just 
arrived home from a long day’s work when the phone rings. When you 
                                                          
 115. Id. at 367. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See generally id. at 369–73 (discussing cases in which “[r]esearch 
subjects have . . . claimed that researchers have duties [of care] arising under 
state common law doctrines grounded in tort, property, or contract.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 119. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
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answer, a soothing voice says, “I am a scientist at Research Institute 
B two time zones away. I was examining your DNA and found a 
variant associated with Disease Y that may be really important for 
your health. Do you want to know about it?” If the scientist were 
particularly thoughtful, she might ask, “Can you come here for 
genetic counseling?” You wonder, What is DNA? How did she get 
mine? What is a variant? What is Disease Y? What is genetic 
counseling? Who is going to pay for me to go to Research Institution 
B? Most importantly, you think, What choice do I have?120 
According to Clayton, this scenario highlights the central 
problems with disclosing IFs that arise from secondary 
research: (1) that the archiving, sharing, and research use of 
DNA is so pervasive and complex that the human sources from 
whom DNA samples are taken may not understand when, how, 
and for what end their DNA can be archived, shared, and 
used;121 (2) that, because of this lack of understanding, sources 
are often unaware that their samples are being used for 
secondary research and may be caught off guard by disclosures 
of IFs; and (3) that researchers may lack the knowledge to 
adequately identify, interpret, and explain the significance of 
IFs arising from their research. Given these problems, Clayton 
argues that it may be appropriate to offer sources the 
opportunity to give informed consent to IF disclosures but that, 
absent such informed consent, “a general policy of offering 
incidental findings to unsuspecting people who had not 
previously thought about the issue just does not seem right.”122 
We bear no cynicism toward this position that unexpected 
disclosures of IFs can pose significant psychological harms to 
unsuspecting sources and that informed consent for such 
disclosures may very well be required by standards for ethical 
research. The concern of biobanks and secondary researchers 
for the welfare of their human sources is tested, however, by 
four notable observations. 
The first observation is paradigmatic in nature—while 
researchers express concerns about the devastating 
psychological harms that a source might face when 
unexpectedly finding out that they may have a problem, they 
                                                          
 120. Ellen Wright Clayton, Incidental Findings in Genetics Research Using 
Archived DNA, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 286, 286 (2008). 
 121. This concern seems based on a view that the average patient is 
incapable of understanding enough about genetic research to make any 
informed choice either before the research is conducted or after the results are 
available. This arguably paternalistic view was also the basis, discarded many 
years ago, for not disclosing drug risks to patients. 
 122. Clayton, supra note 120, at 290–91. 
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seldom discuss the devastating physical harms that a source 
might face if they are not informed about a problem they could 
avoid or mitigate had they been told of it. For whatever 
reasons, the potential psychological risks of disclosure are 
elevated over the medical, clinical, and physical risks posed by 
non-disclosure. 
While providing informed consent for disclosures could 
help address this issue, the effectiveness of this approach is 
curtailed by the second observation—in lieu of providing 
informed consent for disclosures, some biobanks (including 
BioVu, the biobank at Clayton’s own Vanderbilt University) are 
opting to use methods such as irreversible deidentification to 
make disclosure of IFs impossible in the first place.123 This 
approach eliminates the psychological risks of potential 
disclosure by also eliminating the benefits of disclosure of 
medically critical IFs. In many ways, this is again an elevation 
of psychological factors related to disclosure above the other 
risks, benefits, and rights related to the disclosure of critical 
clinical information, as well as rights to know and control how 
one’s biomaterial is being used. 
Third, a disclosure of an IF necessarily also requires 
disclosure of the fact, subject, and scope of the secondary 
research that gave rise to the IF. Such disclosure can expose 
the researcher to criticism and objections. Some human sources 
may well not want any undisclosed or unconsented research to 
be conducted using their biospecimens or DNA data in the first 
place.124 Other human sources may have ethical, religious, or 
other personal objections to having their biospecimens or data 
used in certain types of research.125 For example, some human 
sources might object to the use of their biospecimens or data for 
research into questions of any genetic basis for sexual 
                                                          
 123. See generally Khaled El Emam, Methods for the De-Identification of 
Electronic Health Records for Genomic Research, 3 GENOME MED. (2011), 
available at http://genomemedicine.com/content/pdf/gm239.pdf (discussing 
various de-identification methods in use) and highlighting, specifically, the de-
identification process used by Vanderbilt University’s BioVU). 
 124. See R.M. Sade, Research on Stored Biological Samples is Still 
Research, 162 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1439, 1440 (2002) (“There should 
be no doubt about what is at stake in developing policy for the use of stored 
samples: the fundamental right to decide whether and how one’s body and its 
parts will be used in research.”). 
 125. See id. (discussing the broad range of reasons for which a person may 
not want to participate in research studies). 
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orientation or for the development of certain reproductive or 
contraceptive technologies. Others may object to the use of 
their biospecimens or data for research into ethnic or racial 
differences in the safety or effectiveness of certain drugs or 
medical therapies.126 
Researchers may well wish to avoid facing such potential 
controversy. Along the same lines, informing the human source 
of the research may result in the human source explicitly 
withdrawing consent or affirmatively requesting that he be 
removed from the research, thus putting the research project 
(and the researcher’s role in the research) at risk.127 In fact, 
those who oppose study-specific informed consent often argue 
that allowing human sources to withhold or withdraw consent 
could affect the number of available samples on which to 
conduct research or introduce some selection bias.128 And yet, 
at the same time, these opponents to study-specific informed 
consent also cite to studies that purportedly demonstrate that 
most individuals do not have any objections to the unlimited 
use of their biospecimens in future research without their 
consent.129 This raises the poignant question: If most people 
                                                          
 126. BiDil is the classic example of a drug with an ethnicity based FDA 
approval. There are obvious social, cultural, and ethical issues with race or 
ethnicity based products.  See generally Susan M. Reverby, “Special 
Treatment”: BiDil, Tuskegee, And the Logic of Race, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 
478 (2008) (discussing the issues surrounding BiDil through a racially-
orientated lens). 
 127. See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 850–51 
(2001) (“There is always a potential substantial conflict of interest on the part 
of researchers as between them and the human subjects used in their 
research. If participants in the study withdraw from the research study prior 
to its completion, then the results of the study could be rendered meaningless. 
There is thus an inherent reason for not conveying information to subjects as 
it arises, that might cause the subjects to leave the research project. That 
conflict dictates a stronger reason for full and continuous disclosure.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Mats G. Hansson et al., Should Donors Be Allowed to Give 
Broad Consent to Future Biobank Research?, 7 LANCET ONCOLOGY 266, 266–
67 (2006) (“Since the response for collection of data (eg [sic]. sending out 
questionnaires or asking for renewed consent to use biobank samples obtained 
previously) from any large population commonly ranges between 50% and 
90%, the need for renewed consent for use of biobank material would reduce 
the number of participants available, possibly introducing selection bias and 
decreasing the scientific importance of the studies.”). 
 129. See Marshall B. Kapp, Ethical and Legal Issues in Research Involving 
Human Subjects: Do You Want a Piece of Me?, 59 J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 335, 
337 (2006) (“Other surveys demonstrate that most individuals who have had 
tissue removed for other purposes have no objection to the unlimited use of 
excess tissue in future research studies.”). 
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have no problem consenting to such research, then why are 
researchers so concerned that not enough people will consent? 
Indeed, there appears to be some conflict between the interest 
of the researcher to avoid having to explain and obtain consent 
necessary to sustain their research projects and the rights of 
human sources to know and consent to their involvement in 
research. Eliminating any possibility of IF disclosures has, in 
many respects, also helped to eliminate this conflict, as well as 
the risk of controversy faced by biobanks and researchers. This 
scenario is frighteningly similar to the very controversies that 
gave rise to human subjects research protections in the first 
place.130 
Finally, the fourth observation requires reading the 
subtext of Clayton’s final and most important question posed by 
the hypothetical unsuspecting research participant: “What 
choice do I have?”131 To start, while the question is posed in the 
hypothetical as “what choice do I [the research subject] have 
now that I know that something is wrong with me,” the 
underlying questions seems to be “what legal rights do I [the 
research subject] have now that I know I have been the subject 
of research without my consent,” as well as “what legal or 
ethical requirements do I [the researcher] have now that I have 
found something clinically wrong with the human subject.” It is 
this concern with potential legal liability that we believe may 
be a driving factor for the solution proposed by some: set the 
bar high for when disclosures can take place and permit 
researchers to avoid any legal or ethical obligations by 
immediately and permanently destroying identifying 
information linking archived DNA to their human sources such 
that subsequent disclosure of IFs becomes impossible. 
In the next section, we discuss our own illustrative 
hypothetical example—that which explores what we think is 
likely to happen as biobanks and researchers continue to 
operate without informed consent and continue to avoid 
disclosures of IFs as permitted by federal regulations. 
 
                                                          
 130. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text. 
 131. Clayton, supra note 120. 
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III. ENFORCEMENT AND LIMITS OF IF DISCLOSURES: 
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN STATES GET INVOLVED 
We begin with our own version of Clayton’s hypothetical 
from Part II:132 
 You were a resident of the state of Red five years ago 
when you checked into Hospital A in the state of Blue to 
undergo routine surgery under the care of Dr. Physician for 
disease X, which has long since resolved. Unbeknownst to you, 
a tissue specimen taken from you in the course of your care at 
Hospital A is sent to Biobank B in the state of Green for 
archiving. Six months later, a researcher at Research Institute 
C two time zones away in the state of Yellow obtains your 
specimen from Biobank B and, in the course of research, 
discovers a rare genetic variant associated with malignant 
hyperthermia (MH), a potentially life-threatening condition 
triggered by  exposure to certain commonly used but easily 
substitutable anesthetics. A year later, you move to the state of 
Purple, where you undergo routine surgery and have a severe 
reaction to the anesthesia, leaving you severely injured and 
impaired. In seeking to gain a better understanding of MH and 
how such a tragedy could befall you, you come across a research 
article that discuss MH as an “incidental finding.” Curious 
about what an incidental finding is, you delve a little deeper 
and find the large body of literature on incidental findings 
arising in the course of genetic research, including several 
articles on how hospitals transfer their leftover specimens from 
patients to biobanks for use in genetic research. You try to 
remember if Dr. Physician or anyone at Hospital A ever talked 
to you about what they were going to do with your leftover 
specimen. You wonder, did Hospital A send my leftover 
specimen to a biobank for research? Did they have any right to 
do so without my permission? Is it possible that at some point 
someone conducting research on my specimen discovered that I 
was at risk of MH and didn’t tell me? Most importantly, you 
wonder what are my choices? 
You then discover, perhaps as part of a malpractice suit, 
that your biosample has been transferred from institute to 
institute and subjected to research that screened for MH—all 
without your knowledge or consent. You are particularly 
incensed when you discover that the secondary researchers did 
find that you were at risk for MH and that no one told you or 
                                                          
 132. See Clayton, supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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your physicians. 
We believe that scenarios similar to this are not only likely 
but inevitable especially as public concern for and media 
coverage of issues such as genetic privacy continues to gain 
momentum. The “aha” moment may come when an affected 
individual makes a discovery in the literature such as that 
described in the hypothetical above, or may come when a 
researcher plagued with guilt over an incidental finding decides 
to throw protocol to the wind and blow the proverbial whistle 
by informing someone about a particularly important IF. It 
may also come to the forefront as part of other litigation or 
government enforcement action. Regardless of the specifics, 
when such scenarios arise, the affected individuals are likely 
seek legal counsel to assess what options for redress are 
available to them. In this section, we will use the hypothetical 
above to discuss the panoply of liability issues that such 
scenarios will likely raise for biobank research entities. As we 
proceed with our analysis, we ask the reader to bear in mind 
that such scenarios will play out not once or twice, but with 
multiplying frequency as news of early legal actions garner 
attention from others in similar situations. Indeed, given the 
scale of biobank research activities and the massive number of 
individuals with specimens and data currently archived in 
biobanks, we predict that early suits could quickly give rise to 
class actions. For now, however, let’s continue our analysis of 
the hypothetical at hand. 
Let us assume that the injured party in our hypothetical, 
who we will henceforth call Plaintiff, contacts an attorney 
about his situation. The attorney begins his investigation by 
looking at the informed consent provided to Plaintiff by Dr. 
Physician and Hospital A and finds no disclosure or consent 
pertaining to the research use of leftover specimens from 
surgery. The attorney next inquires as to Hospital A’s practices 
for disposing of leftover specimens from surgical procedures. 
The attorney learns that Hospital A typically sends its leftover 
specimens to biobanks. The attorney further learns that 
Hospital A does not obtain informed consent from its patients 
prior to making such specimen transfers to biobanks. From 
this, the attorney forms his first question: 
• Does Plaintiff have any cause of action against Dr. Physician or 
Hospital A related to their failure to obtain his informed consent 
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prior to transferring his leftover specimen to a biobank for 
storage? 
• Does Plaintiff have any cause of action against Dr. Physician or 
Hospital A related to their transfer of his leftover specimen to a 
biobank for storage? 
The attorney then obtains copies of Hospital A’s material 
transfer agreements and discovers that Plaintiff’s specimen 
was sent to Biobank B. Filing more discovery, the attorney 
obtains Biobank B’s material transfer agreement transferring 
Plaintiff’s deidentified specimen to Research Institute C for 
secondary research. The attorney also learns that Biobank B 
retains the identifying code for all its archived specimens. 
Here, the attorney forms his second and third questions: 
• Does Plaintiff have any cause of action against Biobank B 
related to Biobank B’s failure to obtain his informed consent 
prior to transferring his specimen to Research Institute C? 
• Does Plaintiff have any cause of action against Biobank B 
related to Biobank B’s storage of his specimen for secondary 
research? 
Delving deeper into Research Institute C’s activities, the 
attorney learns that Plaintiff’s specimen was used for a 
research study on genetic markers for a particular type of 
cancer under the leadership of Dr. Investigator. The attorney 
further learns that the R1Y1, the genetic variant for MH, was 
incidentally mapped in the course of this research study. Thus, 
the attorney forms his fourth, fifth, and sixth questions: 
• Does Plaintiff have any cause of action against Research 
Institute C or Dr. Investigator related to their use of his specimen 
for research? 
• Does Plaintiff have any cause of action against Research 
Institute C or Dr. Investigator related to their failure to obtain his 
informed consent prior to commencing research on his 
specimen? 
• Does Plaintiff have any cause of action against Research 
Institute C or Dr. Investigator related to their failure to inform 
him of the incidental R1Y1 finding? 
The attorney begins looking at the types of state laws that 
might exist that could give rise to these potential causes of 
action against Dr. Physician, Hospital A, Biobank B, Research 
Institute C, and Dr. Investigator. Virtually all states have some 
laws that affect the collection, storage, transfer, and use of 
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human specimens, DNA data, and health information.133 
Likewise, states often have laws regarding informed consent 
and medical obligations.134 These laws may be contained in 
states’ statutes and regulations governing human subjects 
research, genetic privacy, health privacy, or medical records 
handling and may include limits on the use (research and 
otherwise) and disclosure of individuals’ medical information or 
genetic data, requirements for informed consent for such uses 
and disclosures, regulations governing genetic testing, and 
restrictions on the purpose, duration, and methods of storage of 
specimens and data.135 Furthermore, property, contract, and 
tort laws, whether statutory or common law, may also impose 
rights and limits arising from the use of human specimens and 
DNA information. 136 
In the following subsections, we discuss these different 
types of laws and the possible causes of action that arise under 
them in our hypothetical. It is important to note that the issue 
of IF disclosures from secondary research involves a far broader 
range of legal issues than just the responsibilities of secondary 
researchers and just the rights of human sources of biological 
specimens and DNA information. Indeed, this complex matter 
implicates or involves a host of unsettled legal issues 
pertaining to the responsibilities of all researchers and the 
rights of all research subjects generally. Furthermore, because 
the biobank research system involves the transfer of materials 
and data from the human source to the primary collection site 
to the biobank to the secondary researcher, we must be 
concerned with the legal rights and responsibilities that exist 
at each link in the chain and how they might be imputed to the 
other links. 
                                                          
 133. HAKIMIAN ET AL., 50-STATE SURVEY OF LAWS REGULATING THE 
COLLECTION, STORAGE, AND USE OF HUMAN TISSUE SPECIMENS AND 
ASSOCIATED DATA FOR RESEARCH, NAT’L INS. OF HEALTH, NAT’L CANCER 
INST., http://www.cancerdiagnosis.nci.nih.gov/humanSpecimens/survey/ 
index.htm (last updated Mar. 5, 2010). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 369 (“Research subjects have also 
claimed that researchers 
have duties arising under state common law doctrines grounded in tort, 
property, or contract.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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A. MEDICAL AND HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY LAWS 
Almost all states have laws regulating the privacy and 
confidentiality of individuals’ medical and health information, 
including in many cases restrictions on the allowable uses and 
disclosures of such information by health care providers, 
insurance companies, government health agencies, and others 
with access to medical and health records and data. Some 
states define medical information as including human tissue 
specimens since these specimens and their associated DNA 
data contain significant health and medical information as well 
as information linking the identity of their human source.137 
For example, California’s Confidentiality of Medical 
Information Act defines “medical information” as “any 
individually identifiable information, in electronic or physical 
form, in possession of or derived from a provider of health care, 
health care service plan, pharmaceutical company, or 
contractor regarding a patient’s medical history, mental or 
physical condition, or treatment.”138 A more direct example 
comes from North Dakota’s Health Information Protection Act 
which defines “protected health information” as: 
[A]ny information, including genetic information, demographic 
information, and fluid or tissue samples collected from an individual, 
diagnostic and test results, whether oral or recorded in any form or 
medium which: 
a. Is created or received by a health care provider, health 
researcher, health plan, health oversight authority, public health 
authority, employer, health or life insurer, school or university; 
and 
b. (1) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental 
health or condition of an individual, including individual cells 
and their components; the provision of health care to an 
individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the 
provision of health care to an individual; and 
(2)(a) Identifies an individual; or 
(b) With respect to which there is a reasonable basis to 
believe that the information can be used to identify an 
individual.139 
Some states’ health and medical information privacy laws 
include provisions that allow for such information to be 
disclosed either generally or specifically for the purposes of 
research without the requirement to obtain individual informed 
                                                          
 137. See Hakimian et al., supra note 133, at 4. 
 138. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.05(g) (West 2011). 
 139. N.D. CENT. CODE § 21-01.3-01 (2011). 
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consent or authorization if the information is first 
deidentified,140 if the researchers avoid identifying the 
patient,141 or if the disclosure has been approved by an IRB or 
some other designated authority.142 Other states require 
patients’ authorization or informed consent prior to any 
disclosures of protected health and medical information, 
including for research purposes. For example, Vermont’s Bill of 
Rights for Hospital Patients states that “[p]articipation by 
patients in clinical training programs or in the gathering of 
data for research purposes shall be voluntary. The patient has 
the right to refuse to participate in such research projects.”143 
Still many other states have statutes with no permitted 
disclosures of medical information for research.144 Finally, 
there may be common law rights relating to privacy, consent, 
ownership of one’s biospecimens, fraud, or patient/physician 
relations that are applicable to a specific situation.145 
So how do these differing state law systems potentially 
                                                          
 140. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.057(7)(a)(4) (2012) (permitting access 
to medical records “[f]or statistical and scientific research, provided the 
information is abstracted in such a way as to protect the identity of the patient 
. . . .”). 
 141. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-37.3-4(b)(3) (West 2011) (“No 
consent for release or transfer of confidential health care information shall be 
required . . . [t]o qualified personnel for the purpose of conducting scientific 
research . . . provided, that personnel shall not identify, directly or indirectly, 
any individual patient in any report of that research . . . or otherwise disclose 
patient identities in any manner . . . .”). 
 142. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-33a-109(3)–(4) (West 2011) permitting 
the State’s Health Data Committee to approve requests for disclosures of 
identifiable health information when the requesting party has received IRB 
approval and when the request for disclosure of information is for “a specified 
period” or “solely for bona fide research and statistical purposes as determined 
in accordance with” the rules of the Utah Department of Health.) These rules 
require “(i) the requesting entity to demonstrate to the department that the 
data is required for the research and statistical purposes proposed by the 
requesting entity; and (ii) the requesting entity [ ] enter into a written 
agreement satisfactory to the department to protect the data in accordance 
with this chapter or other applicable law.” A person granted access to 
identifiable health data under these provisions “may not further disclose the 
identifiable health data: (a) without prior approval of the department; and (b) 
unless the identifiable health data is disclosed or identified by control number 
only.” 
 143. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1852(a)(10) (West 2011). 
 144. Examples of states with statutes not allowing any disclosure of 
medical information for research include Alabama, Idaho, and Illinois. See 
Hakimian, supra note 133. 
 145. See infra Section III.C. for a discussion of these common law rights. 
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impact our hypothetical? The answer, as described more fully 
below, is that there is any number of potential interfaces with 
different state laws. These will not always be consistent as 
state statutory and common laws can vary. 
In our hypothetical, Plaintiff can potentially recover from 
Hospital A for violating health and medical information privacy 
laws if he can bring suit in a state that recognizes tissue 
specimens or DNA information as protected medical 
information and either bars disclosure of medical information 
without authorization or imposes relevant restrictions on when 
and for what purposes medical information can be disclosed.146 
It is important to note that the types of restrictions that are 
relevant here are very broad because Hospital A transferred 
Plaintiff’s specimen to a biobank for archiving and storage and 
not to a researcher for the purposes of research. Consequently, 
even if the applicable state statute permits disclosures of 
medical information without informed consent or authorization 
for the purposes of research, Hospital A has acted outside the 
scope of such permissible disclosures because it sent the 
specimen to a biobank that does not itself conduct research. 
This argument is especially viable in states that impose time 
limits on disclosures of medical and health information. 
Additionally, even if the state in which Plaintiff brings suit 
does not recognize tissue specimens as medical and health 
information, Plaintiff could potentially argue that access to 
such specimens falls within the scope and intent of medical and 
health information privacy laws given the massive amount of 
personally identifiable health and medical data that can be 
extracted from such tissues. Finally, Hospital A may be 
responsible for ensuring that whatever rights Plaintiff has are 
assigned or transferred to the subsequent holders of the 
biospecimens and subsequent researchers. 
Plaintiff can also potentially recover from Biobank B, 
depending on the law of the state in which he brings suit, on 
the grounds of unauthorized use of protected health and 
medical information for the biobank’s storage and archiving of 
the specimen, as well as on the grounds of unauthorized 
                                                          
 146. For example, a recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision, Bearder v. 
State, held that biospecimens collected from newborn infants for the state’s 
newborn bloodspot screening program could not be used for any testing or 
research purposes beyond the specific purposes set forth in the enabling 
statute unless express consent was obtained for the additional research. 
Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 2011). 
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disclosure of protected health and medical information for the 
biobank’s transfer of the specimen Research Institute C. 
Similarly, Plaintiff could potentially recover from Research 
Institute C and Dr. Investigator for unauthorized use of 
protected health and medical information if he brings suit in a 
state that does not permit research use of such information, 
even when it is deidentified, without informed consent. 
There is also then the final question of whether state law 
requirements on the transfer of medical and health information 
can be interpreted as also requiring that any other obligations 
arising under other state statutes or common law for the use or 
disclosure of that medical and health information (such as an 
obligation to disclosure IFs) be transferred with the medical 
and health information. A similar theory would impose liability 
on the various links in the chain by which the biospecimen 
traveled from its initial collection to the ultimate secondary 
researcher. Put otherwise: did Research Institute C or Dr. 
Investigator have any obligation to inform (or at least attempt 
to inform) the original human source of the IF by virtue of 
someone lower in chain by which the biospecimen traveled 
having such an obligation? 
Under general state law concepts discussed in more detail 
in Section C, there may be some duties arising from the 
researcher-research subject’s relationship that require 
informed consent and/or disclosures of IFs  to inform the 
human source of the biospecimen. This duty can potentially be 
found in a number of sources.  First, such a duty is postulated 
by the various commentators who assert that there is some, 
perhaps limited, duty to inform human sources of IFs, 
particularly if, as is the case in this hypothetical, the IFs are 
material and actionable. 147  If such duties exist, then each link 
in the chain by which the biospecimen is transferred may be 
obliged to also assume those duties. In other words, one may 
have an obligation to transfer the biospecimen in a manner 
that transfers any such duties to the next entity.  one may not 
and should not be able to avoid a duty to obtain informed 
consent or warn of an IF by transferring the material that is 
the subject of those duties without ensuring that the duties also 
                                                          
 147. See generally Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 366–73 (discussing different 
sources of researchers’ duties ““to offer findings of likely clinical or 
reproductive significance to research participants.”). 
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transfers.148 Finally, there may be a connection between 
unauthorized research and a subsequent obligation to both 
inform the subject of the unauthorized research and the results 
of that research. 
B. GENETIC TESTING AND GENETIC INFORMATION LAWS 
In addition to health and medical information privacy 
laws, almost all states also have laws on the acquisition, use, 
disclosure, and collection and storage of genetic materials and 
information.149 These laws may govern genetic materials and 
information themselves or may impose requirements and 
restrictions on the act of genetic testing. Definitions of genetic 
testing, materials, and information vary significantly across 
states and may be found in laws with different intents and 
purposes including regulations of genetic testing conduct; 
permissible use of genetic testing, materials, and information; 
limits on storage (including permissible duration) and transfer 
of genetic materials and information; confidentiality of records 
containing genetic information; and informed consent 
requirements for conducting genetic tests, disclosing or access 
genetic materials and information, and performing research on 
genetic materials and information. 
Genetic testing, materials, and information subject to these 
various laws arise under a number of situations, including for 
the purposes medical diagnosis in the clinical context, for 
research purposes, and for government programs such as 
newborn bloodspot screening. Many states’ laws define genetic 
testing, materials, and information and distinguish 
requirements for genetic testing and for the use, storage, and 
disclosure of genetic materials and information on the basis of 
these different contexts. Some states’ laws include broad 
exclusions for genetic testing and information used in the 
research context. One particularly broad example is 
Massachusetts’ laws governing genetic information privacy and 
                                                          
 148. This can be analogized to property law concepts by which obligations 
(such as encumbrances, mortgages or easements) linked to property are 
transferred with the property or to commercial law concepts requiring the 
transfer of liens or other encumbrances to successors. 
 149. See, e.g., Drabiak-Syed, supra note 23 at 304–05 (“[S]everal states 
have passed statutes governing collection of specimens and individual 
information for research purposes. Approximately two-thirds of the states 
have supplemented the federal regulation and enacted provisions specifically 
related to an individual’s genetic information.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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informed consent for genetic testing which defines “genetic 
information” as “any written or recorded individually 
identifiable result of a genetic test,” but provides that: 
[G]enetic information shall not include any information about an 
identifiable person that is taken: 
(1) as a biopsy, autopsy, or clinical specimen solely for the 
purpose of conducting an immediate clinical or diagnostic test 
that is not a test of DNA, RNA, mitochondrial DNA, 
chromosomes or proteins; 
(2) as a blood sample solely for blood banking; 
(3) as a newborn screening pursuant to section 110A; [or] 
(4) as confidential research information for use in epidemiological 
and clinical research conducted for the purpose of generating 
scientific knowledge about genes or learning about genes or 
learning about the genetic basis of disease or for developing 
pharmaceutical and other treatments of disease . . . .150 
Other states’ laws exclude genetic tests and information in 
the clinical context. For example, South Dakota’s laws 
requiring informed consent for medical research involving 
genetic testing and genetic information exclude genetic tests 
and their derivative information obtained in the clinical context 
by defining a “genetic test” as: 
[A] test of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, or genes performed in 
order to identify the presence or absence of an inherited variation, 
alteration, or mutation which is associated with predisposition to 
disease, illness, impairment, or other disorder. Genetic test does not 
mean a routine physical measurement; a chemical, blood, or urine 
analysis; a test for drugs or HIV infection; any test commonly 
accepted in clinical practice; or any test performed due to the 
presence of signs, symptoms, or other manifestations of a disease, 
illness, impairment, or other disorder.151 
Some states use definitions that include no exclusions, 
research or otherwise. For instance, Oregon’s genetic privacy 
and research laws define “genetic test” as “a test for 
determining the presence or absence of genetic characteristics 
in an individual or the individual’s blood relatives, including 
tests of nucleic acids such as DNA, RNA and mitochondrial 
DNA, chromosomes or proteins in order to diagnose or 
determine a genetic characteristic.”152 
Still, another important definitional difference across 
states is whether the definition of “genetic information” 
                                                          
 150. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70G(a)(1)–(4) (West 2011). 
 151. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-14-21(2) (2011). 
 152. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.531(14) (West 2011). 
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includes or is distinguished from biological materials such as 
tissue samples from which genetic information can be 
extracted. Looking again to Oregon’s genetic privacy and 
research laws for an example, a “DNA sample” is defined as 
“any human biological specimen that is obtained or retained for 
the purpose of extracting and analyzing DNA to perform a 
genetic test [and] includes DNA extracted from the 
specimen”153 while “genetic information” is defined as 
“information about an individual or the individual’s blood 
relatives obtained from a genetic test.154 
‘This distinction is significant in a state such as Oklahoma 
which allows deidentified genetic information to be used for 
research without informed consent, but requires informed 
consent for research on “[a]ll stored tissues, including blood, 
that arise from surgery [or] other diagnostic or therapeutic 
steps.”155 
One of the most rigorous regulatory regimes is that of New 
York, which governs confidentiality of genetic information 
under its civil rights laws and provides that biological samples 
may be used for research purposes without specific informed 
consent if the research is IRB approved and if the individual 
who is the source of the sample provided: 
[P]rior written informed consent for the use of their sample for 
general research purposes and did not specify time limits or other 
factors that would restrict use of the sample for the test, and (1) the 
samples have been permanently stripped of identifying information; 
or (2) a coding system has been established to protect the identity of 
the individuals who provided the samples, and an institutional review 
board has reviewed and approved the procedures for the coding 
system.156 
The requirements for this prior written informed consent 
to research are extensive and include: 
(1) a statement that the sample will be used for future genetic tests; 
(2) the time period during which the tissue will be stored, or if no time 
limit is specified, a statement that the tissue will be stored for as long 
as deemed useful for research purposes; 
(3) a description of the policies and procedures to protect patient 
confidentiality; 
(4) a statement of the right to withdraw consent to use of the tissue 
for future use at any time and the name of the organization that 
                                                          
 153. OR. REV. STAT. ANN.  § 192.531(9). 
 154. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.531(11). 
 155. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 3614.4(E) (West 2011). 
 156. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-1(9)(a) (McKinney 2011). 
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should be contacted to withdraw consent; 
(5) a statement allowing individuals to consent to future contact for 
any or all purposes, including the following: (i) research purposes; (ii) 
provision of general information about research findings; and (iii) 
information about the test on their sample that may benefit them or 
their family members in relation to their choices regarding preventive 
or clinical care; and 
(6) a statement explaining the benefits and risks of consenting to 
future contact for the purposes set forth in subparagraph five of this 
paragraph. In no event shall information about specific test results on 
stored  human tissue donated for general research purposes be 
disclosed to an individual without obtaining informed consent for the 
disclosure as [set out earlier in the law].157 
Given the diversity of the laws, we will not dwell in detail 
on the range of causes of action Plaintiff may have against Dr. 
Physician, Hospital A, Biobank, Research Institute C, and Dr. 
Investigator, other than to point out that, depending on the 
state(s) in which he bring suits, Plaintiff may have multiple 
claims against each potential defendant and the strength or 
elements of any such claim may well vary from state to state. 
A more important point for us to raise here is that there 
have recently been several important state judicial decisions 
pertaining to the unauthorized research use of biological 
materials obtained for other purposes, and that the courts 
rendering these decisions have interpreted statutory definitions 
and protections rather favorably toward the human 
source/plaintiff. The most recent of these cases, Bearder v. 
State of Minnesota, was decided by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in November, 2011 and involved as plaintiffs nine 
families and twenty-five children claiming violations of the 
state’s Genetic Privacy Act. In Bearder, the Minnesota 
Department of Health conducted its own research and allowed 
outside research organizations to conduct research using 
leftover blood samples from its newborn screening program 
without first obtaining written informed consent from the 
individual sources of the blood samples as required under the 
Genetic Privacy Act.158 The relevant portion of the Genetic 
Privacy Act provides that: 
Unless otherwise expressly provided by law, genetic information 
about an individual: 
(1) may be collected by a government entity . . . or any other 
                                                          
 157. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-1(9)(e)(1)–(6). 
 158. See generally Bearder v. State, 866 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 2011). 
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person only with the written informed consent of the individual; 
(2) may be used only for purposes to which the individual has 
given written informed consent; 
(3) may be stored only for a period of time to which the individual 
has given written informed consent; and 
(4) may be disseminated only: 
(i) with the individual’s written informed consent; or 
(ii) if necessary to accomplish purposes described by clause 
(2). A consent to disseminate genetic information under (i) 
must be signed and dated. Unless otherwise provided by law, 
such a consent is valid for one year or for a lesser period 
specified in the consent.159 
The first issue before the court was whether blood samples 
qualified as “genetic information” requiring informed consent 
under the Genetic Privacy Act which provides the following two 
definitions for “genetic information”: 
(a) “Genetic information” means information about an identifiable 
individual derived from the presence, absence, alteration, or mutation 
of a gene, or the presence or absence of a specific DNA or RNA 
marker, which has been obtained from an analysis of: 
(1) the individual’s biological information or specimen; or 
(2) . . . 
(b) “Genetic information” also means medical or biological information 
collected from an individual about a particular genetic condition that 
is or might be used to provide medical care to that individual or the 
individual’s family members.160 
The plaintiffs argued that blood samples qualify as genetic 
information because they contain DNA information.161 The 
defendants argued that blood samples are biological specimens 
and not genetic information.162 The court held that blood 
samples could not be genetic information under definition (a), 
as that definition applies to the information resulting from 
genetic testing and not to the specimen that provides that 
source for that information.163 However, the court ruled that 
definition (b) “is broader in scope because it encompasses 
‘medical or biological information’ about an individual. . . [and] 
biological information includes blood samples.”164 The court 
further concluded: 
[E]ven if the Genetic Privacy Act did not define the blood samples 
                                                          
 159. Id. at 771 (citing MINN. STAT. § 13.386(3)). 
 160. Id. at 772 (citing MINN. STAT. § 13.386(1)). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 773. 
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themselves as “genetic information,” those samples unquestionably 
contain genetic information. The Act limits the collection, use, 
storage, or dissemination of genetic information. It would be 
impossible to collect, use, store, or disseminate those samples without 
also collecting, using, storing, or disseminating the genetic 
information contained in those samples.165 
The court then addressed whether the state’s mandatory 
newborn screening law provided the defendants with an 
“expressly provided” exemption from the requirements of the 
Genetic Privacy Act.166 The court concluded that the newborn 
screening law provided the defendants with an exemption only 
to the extent that the blood samples were used for the purposes 
of newborn screening.167 The court held that the defendants 
violated the Genetic Privacy Act’s restrictions on use (by using 
the blood samples for its own research), storage (my retaining 
the blood samples longer than the forty-five days allowed under 
the newborn screening law), and dissemination (by allowing 
outside researchers to use the blood samples).168 
One of the most significant aspects of the Bearder decision 
is that it did not rely on any elements or principles of the 
federal regulatory oversight system. Rather, it was argued and 
decided purely on the grounds of state law and is an example of 
how state law, and not federal law, can be the principal basis 
for determining the rights and responsibilities of human 
sources and researchers. 
C. CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER STATE COMMON LAW 
We address issues of tort, contact, and property law jointly 
in this section as each area provides its own considerations but 
fundamentally interacts with the others. Indeed, statutory and 
case law pertaining to rights and obligations that arise in the 
context of research on human biological specimens and genetic 
information typically involves complex commingling of all three 
of these areas of law. At the heart of these tort, contract, and 
property law issues is the matter of informed consent. It is 
claims of inadequate informed consent or breach of the 
informed consent agreement that typically provide the basis for 
plaintiffs’ tort actions alleging the breach of duty and 
                                                          
 165. Id. at 774. 
 166. Id. at 774–76. 
 167. Id. at 776. 
 168. Id. at 774–76. 
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negligence of physicians and researchers, as well as breach of 
contract and property right actions alleging unauthorized use, 
disclosure, and transfer of biological materials and genetic 
information by researchers. Thus, it is the informed consent 
agreement to which courts typically look to determine the 
assignment of rights and duties in such disputes. It is 
important to note, as previously mentioned, that federal 
regulations governing informed consent prohibit the use of 
exculpatory language that results in a research subject waiving 
any of his legal rights or releasing a researcher or research 
institution from liability for negligence.169  While less common, 
there can also be state law based liability under tort, contract, 
or property law for the failure of researchers or biobanks to 
satisfy the terms and conditions set forth in the informed 
consent document or otherwise established by state law. 
As is the case with state statutory law, causes of action 
arising under state common law involve a range of unsettled 
legal issues pertaining not only to the disclosure of IFs but also 
to the responsibilities of researchers and the rights of all 
research subjects, including human sources of biological 
materials and DNA information, generally. 
i. Tort Law 
Tort liability in negligence depends on the existence of a 
duty of care owed by one party to another. To be successful, a 
negligence claim must demonstrate: (1) that the defendant 
owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) that this duty of care of 
was breached, (3) that the plaintiff suffered some injury as a 
result of that breach, and (4) that the defendant’s failure to 
satisfy the duty of care was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff’s injury.170 The standard by which a duty of care is 
measured depends significantly on the circumstances of the 
relationship between the two parties. In most instances, courts 
will apply a standard of reasonable care under the 
circumstances and test the defendant’s alleged breach against 
the actions of a reasonable person in the same situation.171 
However, some relationships, such as the physician-patient 
relationship, are recognized as requiring a higher standard. 
                                                          
 169. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2011); 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2011). 
 170. 57A AM. JUR. 2D NEGLIGENCE § 71 (2012). 
 171. STEVEN E. PEGALIS, 1 AM. LAW. MED. MALP., STANDARD OF CARE, 
GENERALLY § 3:3 (2011). 
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Physicians owe patients a standard care that is reasonable not 
for average person but for their medical profession.172 
Physicians also have a duty to inform patients of any 
foreseeable risks, as well as of any interests of the physician 
that may present a conflict or affect the patient’s decisions to 
undergo a particular treatment.173 This is often viewed as a 
fiduciary obligation that the physician owes the patient. If a 
patient can prove that he suffered an injury, including the 
decision to not undergo treatment, due to a physician’s failure 
to disclose a foreseeable risk or conflicting interest, the 
physician can be held negligent under medical malpractice 
regardless of any benefits that resulted for the patient. As such, 
the adequacy of informed consent disclosures and procedures is 
paramount to the satisfaction of a physician’s duty of care. 
In 2008, Wolf et al. conducted a comprehensive analysis of 
the duty of care owed by researchers to research participants.174 
The authors report that where a duty of care under a 
physician-patient relationship already exists, a court may 
extend that duty of care to include research activities 
undertaken by the physician.175 For instance, the court in 
Moore v. Regents of the University of California held that a 
patient-plaintiff is permitted to bring an action for breach of 
fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent related to his 
physician’s failure to disclosure his financial interest in 
removing the patient’s spleen and biological specimens for non-
therapeutic research use to develop a cell line.176 Thus, Plaintiff 
in our hypothetical case may be able to assert a negligence 
claim against Dr. Physician and Hospital A based on Dr. 
Physician’s breach of informed consent for failing to disclose to 
Plaintiff that his leftover specimen would be sent to a biobank 
for storage and future downstream research. Furthermore, the 
Plaintiff may be able to assert that Dr. Physician and Hospital 
A failed to disclose the potential benefit they would receive 
                                                          
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 361–62. 
 175. Id. at 369. 
 176. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) 
(holding that “(1) a physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the 
patient’s health, whether research or economic, that may affect the physician’s 
professional judgment; and (2) a physician’s failure to disclose such interests 
may give rise to a cause of action for performing medical procedures without 
informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty.”). 
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(whether financial, professional, or reputational) from storing 
or using the biospecimen or from transferring the biospecimen 
for storage or use by others. Plaintiff might argue that he 
would not have agreed to the surgery had he known about how 
his leftover specimen would be used, would have consented to 
the use of his biospecimens only if certain returns of IFs were 
agreed upon, or would have refused to consent to any storage or 
use of biospecimens for any or particular uses or timeframes 
beyond those needed for immediate treatment. Plaintiff may 
also use the breach of the duty to support a property- or 
contract-based injury as discussed in subsequent sections of 
this paper. 
It is important to note, as Wolf et al. point out, that the 
Moore court dealt only with the existing physician-patient 
relationship and did not address the duties of the defendant as 
a researcher to the plaintiff as a research subject, nor did it 
address the issue of human subjects research without informed 
consent.177 As such, the holding in the Moore case does not fully 
identify the duties of care, if any, owed to our hypothetical 
Plaintiff by Biobank B, Research Institute C, or Dr. 
Investigator or what actions (or failures to act) may amount to 
a breach of those duties. In the absence of a physician-patient 
relationship, courts typically apply a standard duty of 
reasonable care to the researcher-research subject 
relationship.178 Several recent cases, however, suggest that 
courts may be willing to recognize the existence of some special 
relationship between researchers and research subjects that is 
deserving of a higher duty of care, especially as pertains to 
informed consent, though the nature of this special relationship 
is not yet certain. In the case of Greenberg v. Miami Children’s 
Hospital, the district court stated that “since the law regarding 
a duty of informed consent for research subjects is unsettled 
and fact-specific . . . , the Court finds that in certain 
circumstances a medical researcher does have a duty of 
informed consent,” but declined to further elucidate as to when 
and how such a duty attaches.179 In finding for the defendant, 
the district court identified as a factor the distinction that the 
                                                          
 177. Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 369. 
 178. Id. (citing E. Haavi Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and 
Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts On A Learning Curve, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 1, 28–29 (2003)). 
 179. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 
1064, 1070 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
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plaintiffs in Greenberg, who knowingly donated biological 
specimens to a particular researcher for research on a 
particular disease, were “more accurately portrayed as donors 
rather than objects of human experimentation, and thus the 
voluntary nature of their submissions warrant[ed] different 
treatment.”180 This suggests that the court might have attached 
a higher duty of informed consent to the research had the 
biological specimens not been obtained voluntarily from the 
donors explicitly for research, as is the case with our 
hypothetical Plaintiff, Research Institute C, and Dr. 
Investigator. 
This case also opens the door to consider hybrid situations, 
such as the case of our hypothetical, in which the biospecimen 
was obtained as part of the ordinary provision of medical care 
and not as part of any disclosed research program. One can 
certainly argue that the initial relationship pursuant to which 
the biospecimen was obtained controls all subsequent storage 
or research use. Under such an approach, a later informed 
consent by the biobank or researcher might be required. As a 
note, the proposed changes to the Common Rule put forth in 
the ANPRM seem to run counter to this line of argumentation, 
as it provides lesser protections for the rights of the human 
source in situations in which the biospecimen is obtained 
outside of the research context and without any consent.181 
One of the most significant cases in recent years to address 
the rights and duties that arise in the research context is 
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, which involved a research 
program to evaluate the effectiveness of varying degrees of lead 
paint abatement in residential dwellings.182 The researchers 
arranged for the study homes to be rented to families with 
children, most or all of whom were of lower economic standing, 
with the intention that the children would reside in the homes 
over a period of at least two years in order for the researchers 
to be able to test the children’s blood periodically for lead 
contamination.183 The same researchers had found in a prior 
study that the abatement methods in question created lead 
dust that remained in the house over time and was 
                                                          
 180. Id. at 1071. 
 181. See ANPRM, supra note 20, at 44,515. 
 182. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 811–12 (Md. 2001). 
 183. Id. at 822–23. 
006 FATEHI HALL_PROOF - SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012  1:16 PM 
2012] ENFORCING THE RIGHTS OF HUMAN SOURCES 625 
“particularly hazardous for children because hand-to-mouth 
activity is recognized as a major route of entry of lead into the 
body and because absorption of lead is inversely related to 
particule size.”184 According to the court, “[i]t was anticipated 
that the children, who were the human subjects in the 
program, would, or at least might, accumulate lead in their 
blood from the dust, thus helping the researchers to determine 
the extent to which the various partial abatement methods 
worked.”185 The informed consent agreement signed by the 
children’s parents, however, did not explain that the research 
study would assess the success of the abatement methods by 
measuring the level of lead contamination in the children’s 
blood.186 Noting that neither the researchers nor the IRB that 
approved the research “saw [anything] wrong with the research 
protocols that anticipated the possible accumulation of lead in 
the blood of otherwise healthy children as a result of the 
experiment,” the Maryland Court of Appeals looked to a wide 
range of authorities on ethical human subjects research 
standards, including international codes, treatises, and 
academic writings, to determine “the duties, if any, arising out 
of the use of children as subjects of research.”187 The court 
stated first that, regardless of how informed the consent, 
parents have no right to enlist their children in potentially 
hazardous nontherapeutic research.188 The court further stated 
that: 
The research relationship proffered to the parents of the children the 
researchers wanted to use as measuring tools, should never have been 
presented in a nontherapeutic context in the first instance. Nothing 
about the research was designed for treatment of the subject children. 
They were presumed to be healthy at the commencement of the 
project. As to them, the research was clearly nontherapeutic in 
nature. The experiment was simply a “for the greater good” project. 
The specific children’s health was put at risk, in order to develop low-
cost abatement measures that would help all children, the landlords, 
and the general public as well.189 
The court held that “special relationships, out of which 
duties arise, the breach of which can constitute negligence, can 
                                                          
 184. Id. at 812 (citing Mark R. Farfel & J. Julian Chisolm, Jr., Health and 
Environmental Outcomes of Traditional and Modified Practices for Abatement 
of Residential Lead-Based Paint, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1240, 1243 (1990)). 
 185. Id. at 812–13. 
 186. Id. at 849. 
 187. Id. at 813–14. 
 188. Id. at 814–15. 
 189. Id. at 815–16. 
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result from the relationships between researcher and research 
subjects” based on the facts and circumstances of the particular 
scenario in question, even in the absence of federal or state 
statutes recognizing such a relationship.190 The court further 
stated that: 
A special relationship giving rise to duties, the breach of which might 
constitute negligence, might also arise because, generally, the 
investigators are in a better position to anticipate, discover, and 
understand the potential risks to the health of their subjects. . . . This 
duty requires the protection of the research subjects from 
unreasonable harm and requires the researcher to completely and 
promptly inform the subjects of potential hazards existing from time 
to time because of the profound trust that participants place in 
investigators, institutions, and the research enterprise as a whole to 
protect them from harm. “Faced with seemingly knowledgeable and 
prestigious investigators engaged in a noble pursuit, participants may 
simply assume that research is socially important or of benefit to 
them individually; they may not be aware that participation could be 
harmful to their interests.”191 
Quite significantly, the court also stated that: 
Researchers cannot ever be permitted to completely immunize 
themselves by reliance on consents, especially when the information 
furnished to the subject, or the party consenting, is incomplete in a 
material respect. A researcher’s duty is not created by, or 
extinguished by, the consent of a research subject or by IRB approval. 
. . . Such legal duties, and legal protections, might additionally be 
warranted because of the likely conflict of interest between the goal of 
the research experimenter and the health of the human subject, 
especially, but not exclusively, when such research is commercialized. 
There is always a potential substantial conflict of interest on the part 
of researchers as between them and the human subjects used in their 
research. If participants the study withdraw from the research study 
prior to its completion, then the results of the study could be rendered 
meaningless. There is thus an inherent reason for not conveying 
information to subjects as it arises, that might cause the subjects to 
leave the research project. That conflict dictates a stronger reason for 
full and continuous disclosure.192 
The Grimes case is significant for the issue of IF 
disclosures from secondary research for several reasons. First, 
it demonstrates the ability and willingness of state courts to 
attach duties to researchers, including and beyond the duty of 
informed consent, which are far more stringent than those 
                                                          
 190. Id. at 846. 
 191. Id. at 851 (citing NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, ETHICAL AND 
POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 2–3 (2001)). 
 192. Id. at 850–51. 
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required under federal human subjects protection laws 
including the Common Rule.193 It also sets forth the conflict 
between the interest of the researcher in the research (and his 
career) and the interests of the human source.194 Critically, it 
shows that issues of consent and inappropriate research are, 
unfortunately, alive and well today.195 The court was clearly 
distressed by what it perceived as a lack of concern by the 
researchers and IRB for the interests of the research 
subjects.196 Furthermore, it shows that state courts may derive 
and define the duties owed by the researcher to the human 
subject not just from the relationship created by, and terms of, 
the informed consent agreement, but from the privileged ability 
of researchers to “anticipate, discover, and understand” their 
subjects’ potential health risks.197 
This ability to anticipate is closely related to another duty, 
the duty to warn, recognized in an earlier case, Blaz v. Michael 
Reese Hospital Foundation.198 The plaintiff in the Blaz case had 
received x-ray therapy as a child and was notified fifteen years 
later by the hospital that treated him that he was at a higher 
risk of developing thyroid tumors as a result of the x-ray 
therapy, and that the hospital would provide him with follow-
up evaluation and treatment at his own expense.199 The 
plaintiff refused the hospital’s offer for follow-up care.200 
Meanwhile, the hospital established a “Thyroid Follow-Up 
Project,” under the direction of Dr. Schneider, to study the 
effects of the x-ray therapy in question.201 Dr. Schneider 
submitted to the NIH a research protocol based on the Project’s 
finding of “strong evidence” connecting the x-ray therapy to the 
development of several types of tumors including neural 
tumors.202 Subsequently, the plaintiff was sent a questionnaire 
accompanied by a letter stating that the questionnaire’s 
purpose was to “investigate the long term health implications” 
                                                          
 193. See id. at 846. 
 194. Id. at 851. 
 195. See id. at 811. 
 196. See id. at 852–55. 
 197. Id. at 851. 
 198. Blaz v. Michael Reese Hosp. Found., 74 F. Supp. 2d 803, 805 (N.D. Ill. 
1999). 
 199. Id. at 804. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
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and “associated risks” of the childhood x-ray therapy the 
plaintiff had received.203 The letter did not disclose, however, 
the “strong evidence” linking the x-ray therapy to tumor 
development.204 After being diagnosed with neural tumors, the 
plaintiff sued both the hospital and Dr. Schneider, alleging that 
“they failed to notify and warn him of their findings that he 
might be at greater risk of neural tumors in a way that might 
have permitted their earlier detection and removal or other 
treatment.”205 Dr. Schneider argued that he had no duty to 
warn because he had never treated the plaintiff as a physician 
treats a patient.206 In reaching a decision for the plaintiff, the 
court used the general criteria established by the Illinois 
Supreme Court for determining the existence of a legal duty: 
“(1) whether the harm reasonably was foreseeable, . . . (2) the 
likelihood of injury, (3) the magnitude of the burden of 
guarding against it, and (4) the consequences of placing that 
burden upon the defendant.”207 
The court further stated that “[a] duty to warn exists when 
there is ‘unequal knowledge and the defendant, possessed of 
such knowledge, knows or should know that harm might occur 
if no warning is given.’”208 The court held that “[a] reasonable 
physician, indeed any reasonable person, could foresee that if 
someone were warned of ‘strong evidence’ of a connection 
between treatments to which he had been subjected and 
tumors, he would probably seek diagnosis or treatment and 
perhaps avoid these tumors, and if he were not warned he 
probably would not seek diagnosis or treatment, increasing the 
likelihood that he would suffer from such tumors.”209 The court 
further stated that, even if the risk of injury were small, 
“placing the burden on the defendant rather than the plaintiff 
is the only decision that makes sense, since Dr. Schneider was 
in a special position to acquire the information and had in fact 
done so, while Mr. Blaz was in no position to find out.”210 The 
                                                          
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 806. 
 207. Id. at 805. (internal quotation omitted). 
 208. Id. (citing Kokoyachuk v. Aeroquip Corp., 526 N.E.2d 607, 610 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1988)). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 805–06. 
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recognition of duties arising from the ability of researchers to 
foresee or identify information of health significance to 
research participants is a factor that is especially significant in 
the context of secondary research on archived specimens and 
DNA information because the very purpose of such secondary 
research is often to establish the link between particular 
conditions and the traits thought to be associated with those 
conditions. Thus, a researcher that obtains specimens from a 
biobank to conduct a partial or whole genome study can 
anticipate the possibility of an incidental discovery of health 
significance to the human source, including the incidental 
discovery of a condition for which there is no routine clinical 
screening.211 
A second reason for the significance of the Grimes decision 
is that it shows that state courts may regard the intentions of 
researchers with suspicion if they surmise that the withholding 
of information or consent is a ruse to avoid obligations on the 
researchers or to ensure that participants enroll or do not 
withdraw from a study.212 As a related matter, Grimes shows 
that state courts may prioritize the welfare and interests of 
individuals above the scientific and societal benefits of 
research.213 Again, this is especially salient in the context of 
secondary research on stored specimens and DNA information 
because the very position of many in the research community, 
including the opinions informing the recent ANPRM, has been 
that the immense benefits of genetic research outweigh the 
“minimal risks” to human sources of genetic material and 
information.214 
Furthermore, as some have suggested, part of the rationale 
for not requiring informed consent and for not returning 
research results and IFs to human sources of genetic material 
and information is the concern that not enough people will opt 
to participate in genetic research.215 This sentiment underpins 
the decision of the court in Greenberg to not extend the duty of 
informed consent to include disclosure of the researchers’ 
economic interest under the rationale that such a duty “would 
chill medical research as it would mandate that researchers 
                                                          
 211. See Wolf et al., supra note 45, at 223. 
 212. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 811–12 (Md. 
2001). 
 213. See id. at 815–16, 837. 
 214. See ANPRM, supra note 20, at 44,516–17. 
 215. See Hansson, supra note 128. 
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constantly evaluate whether a disclosable event has occurred 
[and] would give rise to a type of dead-hand control that 
research subjects could hold because they would be able to 
dictate how medical research progresses.”216 The Blaz court 
also addressed this concern, but reached a different conclusion 
than the Greenberg court, stating: 
The only policy concern I can see here is that it might be thought to 
inhibit research into the effects of medical treatment if nontreating 
physicians in charge of such research programs are held to have a 
duty to warn the former patients of risks discovered in that research. 
But this does not strike me as a real worry. First, the duty would be 
discharged by a mere warning which, as explained, would here have 
been neither costly nor burdensome to give. The more costly and 
burdensome the warning would be to give, of course, the less likely 
there would be a finding of duty. Second, the medical researchers’ 
legitimate desire for professional prestige and honor due to new 
discoveries would counteract any such inhibition; as of course would 
the concern for the well-being of its former patients which any self-
respecting hospital would have.217 
Against this rather nebulous and unsubstantial worry I 
must balance the fact that a finding of no duty would allow 
physicians in charge of hospital research programs into the 
risks of treatment policies to exploit the results of that research 
for their professional advancement and curiosity without 
warning the patients of any risks connected with those 
treatments which their research discovered, however little the 
cost of warning. I can see no social benefit in creating such a 
perverse incentive structure, particularly in view of the costs to 
the patients and society of preventable tumors and other 
illnesses. Preventative care is not an overriding good, but it is a 
considerable one.218 
Thus, our hypothetical Plaintiff may have claims against 
the defendant physician, hospital, researchers, and institution 
for failing to obtain proper consent, for failing to disclose 
possible physician and researcher conflicts, and for failing to 
disclose important medical information to Plaintiff. As 
articulated in the previous section, Plaintiff may also have a 
claim against each defendant for failing to ensure the transfer 
of his own duties to those subsequently taking custody of 
                                                          
 216. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 
1064, 1070–71 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 217. Blaz v. Michael Reese Hosp. Found., 74 F. Supp. 2d 803, 807 (N.D. Ill. 
1999) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 218. Id. 
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Plaintiff’s biospecimen, as well as for failing to satisfy the 
duties of the person who had custody of the biospecimen before 
him. 
ii. Property Law 
The existence and limits of property rights to human 
biological specimens and genetic information is an unsettled 
but central matter to legal issues pertaining to the collection, 
use, and disclosure/transfer of these specimens and 
information. Under principles of property law, courts can 
award both injunctive and compensatory relief, as well as 
punitive damages to plaintiffs whose interests have been 
violated. There are currently no states that explicitly recognize 
an individual’s ownership rights to his biological specimens, 
but at least two states, Georgia and Colorado, do have statutes 
that recognize individual ownership of genetic information.219 
The extent to which this ownership of genetic information is 
tantamount to a personal property right, however, is dubious 
since both Georgia and Colorado also permit such genetic 
information to be used for research without informed consent 
when the information is not individually identifiable.220 
Furthermore, the extent to which statutory silence on 
ownership of biological specimens and genetic information 
indicates whether such rights exist or do not exist is yet to be 
determined definitively. 
Many commentators have been quick to write off issues of 
property law as they pertain to research on human biological 
specimens and genetic information in light of three seminal 
judicial decisions—Moore v. Regents of the University of 
California, Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital, and 
Washington University v. Catalona—all of which are often cited 
                                                          
 219. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (West 2011) (“Genetic 
information is the unique property of the individual to whom the information 
pertains.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (West 2011) (“Genetic information is 
the unique property of the individual tested”). 
 220. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(5) (“Notwithstanding [provisions 
requiring informed consent], any research facility may use the information 
derived from genetic testing for scientific research purposes so long as the 
identity of any individual to whom the information pertains is not disclosed to 
any third party . . . .”); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-6 (“Notwithstanding [provisions 
requiring informed consent], any research facility may conduct genetic testing 
and may use the information derived from genetic testing for scientific 
research purposes so long as the identity of any individual tested is not 
disclosed to any third party . . . .”). 
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as holding that individuals do not have property rights to their 
biological materials and genetic information once those 
materials have been legally obtained by another.221 Strict 
application of the reasoning used in these cases does not 
support the conclusion that individuals have no property rights 
to their biological materials and genetic information.222 Rather, 
these cases hold that either the type of property interests 
claimed by the plaintiffs or the facts of the specific case did not 
support the particular property interest or causes of action that 
the plaintiffs asserted.223 Furthermore, each of these cases 
speaks only to a subset of the property law issues arising under 
the biobank research system. Indeed, questions of property 
rights in the context of the biobank research system and its 
permissible activities under federal law are broad and include: 
• What ownership rights, if any, do human sources have to 
exclude another from possession or use of their biological 
materials and genetic information in the first place? 
• What property rights, if any, do human sources have to set 
conditions and limits on the possession or use of their biological 
materials and genetic information by another? 
• What property rights, if any, do physicians and researchers have 
to the biological materials or genetic information of a human 
source? 
• What property rights, if any, does the human source retain to the 
biological materials or genetic information? 
• What property rights, if any, do researchers have to the results of 
research conducted on the biological materials or genetic 
information of a human source? What property rights, if any, 
does the human source have to those research results? 
• What effect does the deidentification of biological materials or 
genetic information have on these various property rights, if they 
exist? 
In this section, we will first review the facts and holdings 
of Moore, Greenberg, and Catalona, and then discuss what 
bearing these decisions have on the questions posed above. 
The Moore case involved a patient plaintiff, George Moore, 
who signed an informed consent to have his spleen removed 
                                                          
 221. E.g., Lori Andrews, Who Owns Your Body? A Patient’s Perspective on 
Washington University v. Catalona, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 398, 400 (2006). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
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and various biological materials excised as part of his medical 
treatment for hairy cell leukemia.224 The informed consent 
stated that the hospital could “dispose of any severed tissue or 
member by cremation.”225 Unbeknownst to Moore, the 
physician providing his treatment subsequently used his 
biological materials for research purposes and patented a 
lucrative cell line based on Moore’s cells.226 Moore sued the 
physician and his hospital claiming conversion of personal 
property, breach of duty to obtain informed consent, and breach 
of fiduciary duty for using the biological material without his 
consent.227 The property right being asserted by Moore was the 
right to profit from a subsequent use of his biospecimens.228 
The court rejected Moore’s claim of conversion and held that 
Moore’s property interest in his cells, if he ever had any, were 
extinguished once the cells were legally removed from his 
body.229 In rejecting the conversion claim, the court relied on (1) 
the fact that no other reported judicial decision supported the 
conclusion that such a continuing property interest in excised 
human materials exists, (2) that California’s statutory law 
placed significant limits on the continuing interest of patients 
in their excised materials, (3) that Moore’s cells were “no more 
unique to Moore than the number of vertebrae in the spine or 
the chemical formula of hemoglobin,” and (4) that any property 
interests necessary to protect Moore’s privacy and dignity are 
unnecessary due to the protections provided by the informed 
consent agreement that Moore signed.230 
In Greenberg, the plaintiffs sued on behalf of their children 
who had donated blood and tissue specimens to a researcher, 
not for any therapeutic purpose, but specifically for the 
researcher’s work on identifying the genetic causes of Canavan 
disease.231 When the researcher developed and patented a 
prenatal genetic test for Canavan disease and began obtaining 
royalties whenever the test was used, the plaintiffs sued 
                                                          
 224. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990). 
 225. Rohn K. Robbins, Vail Daily column: Do you own your DNA?, VAIL 
DAILY (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.vaildaily.com/article/20110222/ 
BIZ/110229956. 
 226. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481–82. 
 227. Id. at 480–85. 
 228. Id. at 487. 
 229. Id. at 493. 
 230. Id. at 488–93. 
 231. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 
1064, 1067–68 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
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claiming that their consent to the use of the biological 
materials was based on an understanding that the materials 
would only be used for identifying the genetic cause of the 
disease, that the research would remain in the public domain to 
promote additional research on the diseases, and that any tests 
developed pursuant to the research would be broadly accessible 
and priced affordably.232 Among their claims, the plaintiffs’ 
alleged that they had a property interest in their biological 
specimens and genetic information and that the defendants 
engaged in conversion by using the specimens and genetic 
information “for the hospitals’ ‘exclusive economic benefit.’”233 
To support their claim of a property interest in the specimens 
and genetic information, the plaintiffs cited Florida’s genetic 
testing statute which provides that “persons who contribute 
body tissue for researchers to use in genetic analysis do not 
relinquish ownership of the results of the analysis.”234 Again, 
the plaintiff was asserting a right to the financial proceeds or 
benefits from the use of the biospecimens.235 In rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ conversion claim, the Greenberg court characterized 
the transfer of the specimens and genetic information as 
“donations to research without any contemporaneous 
expectations of return [to the donor].”236 The court further held 
that even if Florida’s genetic testing statute “create[s] a 
property right in genetic material donated for medical research 
purposes, it is unclear whether this confers a property right for 
conversion, a common law cause of action.”237 The court’s 
language supports the view that property rights in 
biospecimens or genetic material may exist in another scope.238 
The court reasoning in this case was that the state statute only 
provided penalties for unauthorized disclosure of genetic 
information or lack of informed consent to genetic testing and, 
as such, only conferred property rights to the extent necessary 
to serve those interests.239 Interestingly, on these grounds, the 
Plaintiff in our hypothetical (or a plaintiff in a case of 
                                                          
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 1074. 
 234. Id. at 1075 (citing FLA. STAT. § 760.40 (2011)). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 1074. 
 237. Id. at 1075. 
 238. See id. 
 239. Id. 
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unconsented transfer and research using biospecimens of the 
type arguably permitted under the ANPRM) might have a 
property claim under this statute in Greenberg. 
The Catalona case involved Dr. Catalona, a physician and 
researcher, who, in the course of his employment at 
Washington University, collected biological samples removed 
during surgery for subsequent research on the genetic causes of 
prostate cancer.240 These samples along with others collected by 
his colleagues were stored in the University’s biorepository for 
prostate cancer research.241 The individual sources of the 
biological samples were invited to participate in the genetic 
research studies and were required to sign informed consent 
forms indicating that the collection of samples was for medical 
research and not for clinical care, that the biological samples 
“may be used for research with our collaborators at 
[Washington University], other institutions, or companies,” and 
that the participant “agree[s] to waive any claim [he] might 
have to the body tissues that [he] donate[s]” and also “waive[s] 
the right to any new material or process developed through 
research involving [his] tissues.”242 The consent forms also 
stated that “participation is voluntary and [the participant] 
may choose not to participate in this research study or 
withdraw [his] consent at any time.”243 Some, but not all, 
consent forms stated that participants deciding to withdraw 
from the research could request that their biological samples be 
destroyed, but noted that research results obtained prior to the 
request could not be destroyed.244 Participants were also 
provided with an informational brochure indicating that their 
biological samples “may be shared with other authorized 
researchers doing research in similar fields at [Washington 
University] and other research centers,” and “may be used for 
studies currently in progress or studies conducted 10 or 20 
years from now.”245 The brochure further provided that: “You 
will receive no monetary payment for your tissue nor can you 
claim ownership rights to any medical or scientific product that 
results from research with your tissue.”246 Over time, both Dr. 
                                                          
 240. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 241. Id. at 670–72. 
 242. Id. at 671. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
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Catalona and other University researchers transferred 
biological materials from the biorepository to other research 
institutes through the use of material transfer agreements.247 
In 2003, Dr. Catalona accepted a position at Northwestern 
University and sent a letter requesting that they sign a 
“Medical Consent & Authorization” form stating: 
I have donated a tissue and/or blood sample for Dr. William J. 
Catalona’s research studies. Please release all of my samples to Dr. 
Catalona at Northwestern University upon his request. I have 
entrusted these samples to Dr. Catalona to be used only at his 
direction and with his express consent for research projects.248 
Following this, Washington University “filed a declaratory 
judgment action against Dr. Catalona, seeking to establish its 
ownership . . . of the biological [samples].”249 Dr. Catalona 
counterclaimed “that the [research participants] have the right 
to direct transfer of their biological samples to him” and sought 
an order prohibiting Washington University from using, 
transferring, or destroying the biological samples.250 Shortly 
thereafter, eight of the research participants were joined as 
defendants claiming the right to direct transfer to Dr. 
Catalona.251 The district court found and the court of appeals 
affirmed that Washington University was the sole owner of the 
biological samples to the exclusion of any property rights 
asserted by Dr. Catalona or the research participants.252 Thus 
Catalona decided who, among two claimants, had key property 
rights.253 In reaching this decision, the court, out of necessity, 
had to find that there were at least some property rights in the 
biospecimens.254 
While often cited as establishing that human sources have 
no property rights in their biological materials and genetic 
information, these three cases, both jointly and individually, 
only address a subset of the property issues raised by the 
biobank research system and, furthermore, suggest and in 
some cases explicitly find that human sources do have some 
                                                          
 247. Id. at 672. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 673. 
 252. Id. at 676–77. 
 253. See id. 
 254. See id. 
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property rights, though not the same rights as they asserted in 
their claims, to their samples and information. 
The issue decided in Greenberg and in Moore was whether 
the plaintiffs have a proprietary right to control or share in the 
fruits of research for which they voluntarily gave their 
biological specimens or, put otherwise, whether they have a 
property interest in the products that results from research 
using their specimens. This issue is not the same as the 
questions of whether (1) human sources have original property 
rights in their biological materials or DNA data such that they 
can exclude others from use in the first place and, if so, 
whether (2) human sources retain any residual property 
interests in these materials and data themselves after the first 
instances of granting use to another. The first question may 
seem to be addressed in Moore, as part of the plaintiff’s claim 
was that no consent was obtained for the use of his cells in 
research in the first place.255 However, the important and often 
overlooked factor in the court’s rejection of Moore’s claim was 
that Moore’s assertion of property rights was to support his 
claim for conversion of property, a strict liability general intent 
tort that arises from wrongful interference with one’s 
ownership and possessory rights.256 In essence, the court held 
that Moore had relinquished any property rights he had in his 
cells because he did not intend to ever possess them again and 
because they would have no value to him even if he could 
regain their possession.257 This does mean, however, that a 
court would not recognize a different type of property right 
supporting a different tort claim or a claim arising under 
contracts. 
A simplistic analogy can been drawn to a situation in 
which one throws away a bunch of baseball cards that the 
garbage collector picks up and takes for himself. The original 
owner of the baseball cards relinquished his property interest 
in the cards when he knowingly placed them by the curb for 
trash removal and, thus, he has no claim for conversion against 
the garbage collector. However, if the garbage collector said to 
the owner (or, more aptly, offered the owner a written 
agreement), “I see that you have some old baseball cards that 
you no longer want. I am a garbage collector, and I will take 
                                                          
 255. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990). 
 256. Id. at 494. 
 257. See id. at 492. 
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your baseball cards to the city incinerator and burn them” and 
then took and used the cards for himself, the original owner 
may claim that he did not relinquish his ownership interest in 
the cards, but transferred possession to the garbage collector in 
the form of a bailment. It may seem that such a claim is 
susceptible to an argument that the original owner suffered no 
injury since he clearly placed no value in the baseball cards 
and, thus, suffered no loss as a result of the garbage collector 
taking the cards for himself. This is not the case, however, in 
the instance of biological specimens removed in the course of 
clinical care. Consider, instead, that unbeknownst to the 
original owner, his stack of old baseball cards included 
Bowman’s 1951 classic collection worth approximately half a 
million dollars. Let’s assume also that, unbeknownst to the 
original owner, the garbage collector is also an established 
sports memorabilia trader who had reason to know that the 
owner had some potentially valuable baseball cards. If the 
garbage collector then offered the owner of the baseball cards 
the same (possibly written) agreement to take and burn the 
cards at the city incinerator without also disclosing his status 
as a sports memorabilia trader, then the original owner may 
claim that he only relinquished his property interest in the 
cards because he believed they would be incinerated and that, 
had he known the garbage man was a sports memorabilia 
trader, he would have reconsidered relinquishing his rights. 
Likewise, the human source of a biospecimen may well 
retain certain privacy or other rights under state and federal 
law and may also anticipate some benefit in the form of 
additional research and disclosure of IFs. Furthermore, the 
human source may well successfully assert that he 
relinquished control of the biospecimens only for purposes of 
medical care and did not consent to later research or even have 
any knowledge that such research might take place. A 
defendant researcher may be hard-pressed to successfully 
argue that the plaintiff knowingly relinquished any property 
rights relating to later research when the plaintiff had no 
knowledge of any such research and did not consent to such 
research. 
This line of analysis supports the court’s decision in Moore 
to overrule the defendants’ demurrers to the causes of action 
for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent, 
concluding that the physician-researcher did have a duty to 
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disclose his financial interest in the cells excised from Moore 
and that Moore should be allowed to amend his claims for any 
injuries resulting from these breaches.258 Such thinking is also 
supported by some commentators who argue that agreement 
between human sources of biological materials and 
physicians/researchers should be regarded as a partial 
entrustment agreement, where the human source entrusts his 
or her biomaterial to a trusted health care provider or 
researcher for specific purposes and with specific 
expectations.259 
There are a number of examples of potential property 
rights that might exist under different state laws. First, the 
cases cited above analyze state property laws. Just because one 
state does not recognize a particular property right does not 
conclusively establish that a different state might not, by 
common law or statute, find that the very same property right 
does exist. Even under these cases, there may be property 
rights in how the biospecimen can be used, residual rights to 
reassert control over the property, and confidentiality rights. 
To the extent that there is some property right in the 
biospecimen, deidentification does not and cannot eliminate 
any such right, even if the right is limited to a privacy interest. 
One has rights to property even if one’s name is not on it. A 
mechanic grinding the VIN number off of a car does not sever 
any property rights of the car owner, nor does a fotomat 
blurring the face in a boudoir picture sever any property rights 
of the film owner. And, at the end of the day, one must 
remember that at some point in time—at least at the time of 
the initial sample collection—the specimen was identified and 
identifiable. Subsequent deliberative actions by a researcher or 
biobank cannot unilaterally deprive the human source of 
whatever property rights he might have. Allowing such a 
deprivation would permit a third-party to eliminate property 
rights without permission and for his own benefit. 
iii. Contract Law 
A contract is an agreement entered into by two or more 
parties with the intention of creating legally enforceable 
                                                          
 258. See id. at 497. 
 259. See, e.g., Henry S. Richardson & Mildred K. Cho, Special Article, 
Secondary Researchers’ Duties to Return Incidental Findings and Individual 
Research Results: A Partial-Entrustment Account, 14 GENETICS MED. 467 
passim (2012). 
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obligations on each party.260 Under common law principles, a 
party that breaches a contract may owe the non-breaching 
party, also called the party at loss, some remedy for the breach 
either in the form of specific performance of the contract, 
injunctive relief, or monetary damages.261 For a contract to 
exist, there must be mutual assent by the parties as to the 
terms of the contract (also called a “meeting of the minds”), an 
intent by the parties to create a legal relationship, and an 
element of consideration understood as some bargained-for 
exchange of value or forbearance of a legal right that serves as 
inducement for mutual performance of the contract.262 
Furthermore, for a contract to be legally enforceable, all parties 
must have capacity to enter the contract, the purpose and the 
form of the contract must be legal, and the parties must 
consent to the contract.263 Thus, a contract may be void or 
voidable264 if it is the product of coercion, undue influence, 
duress, failure to disclose material information, fraud or 
misrepresentation in the inducement, or a lack of capacity to 
contract.265 
Furthermore, third parties who receive the benefit of a 
contract may have obligations to one or more of the original 
parties to a contract under the common law doctrine of privity 
or under third-party beneficiary principles established under 
statutory and case law.266 
The issue of whether and to what extent informed consent 
agreements memorialize a contractual relationship is of 
paramount importance to the rights and obligations of human 
sources and biobank research entities, as well as to the 
potential remedies available to human sources claiming the 
absence or the breach of informed consent. If an informed 
consent agreement is viewed as demonstrative of a contractual 
                                                          
 260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT]. 
 261. Id. at § 345. 
 262. Id. at § 17(1). 
 263. Id. at §12. 
 264. Voidness refers to whether a contract ever came into existence 
typically because of a party’s lack of intent to form the contract. Voidability 
refers to whether a contract can be set aside due the assertion of an 
affirmative defense by which a party can avoid his obligations under the 
contract. 
 265. RESTATEMENT, at § 163, 174–77. 
 266. 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37:1 (4th ed.). 
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relationship between a researcher and a human source, then a 
breach of that contract by the researcher in the form of 
unconsented use, transfer, disclosure, or deidentification of the 
human source’s biospecimen or DNA data can be regarded as 
an injury for which the human source is entitled to a remedy. 
In many respects, informed consent documents arising in 
the context of research are contracts in that they are 
enforceable only when there is intent and mutual assent by 
both parties and are voidable if there is coercion, duress, 
misrepresentation, withholding of material facts, or the like.267 
Indeed, researchers and research subjects, as well as courts 
adjudicating disputes between these two parties, typically look 
first to the language of consent documents to determine the 
terms of the research subject’s participant in the research and 
the extent and limits of the researcher’s allowable activities 
under the agreement.268 However, the relationship created by 
an informed consent agreement and the rights and obligations 
of parties subject to such an agreement differ from those 
arising under conventional contract law in two important ways. 
First, while contracts often serve as the genesis for a 
legally enforceable relationship between two parties, informed 
consent documents are not necessary to establish a legal 
relationship between researchers and research subjects. As 
previously described, courts may recognize the existence of a 
researcher-research subject relationship with legally 
enforceable rights and duties as arising from a tort-based duty 
of care.269 Furthermore, where informed consent documents do 
exist, some state court decisions have used these documents to 
find legally enforceable arrangements other than those 
                                                          
 267. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2011) (“[N]o investigator may involve a human 
being as a subject in research . . . unless the investigator has obtained the 
legally effective informed consent of the subject or the subject’s legally 
authorized representative. An investigator shall seek such consent only under 
circumstances that provide the prospective subject or the representative 
sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to participate and that 
minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence. The information that 
is given to the subject or the representative shall be in language 
understandable to the subject or the representative.”); see also Grimes v. 
Kennedy Krieger Institute, 782 A. 2d 807, 844 (Md. Court of App. 2001) 
(stating that informed consent agreements can create a contract and that 
research subjects are “entitled to all material information” prior to entering 
the agreement) (emphasis in original). 
 268.  See, e.g., Grimes 782 A. 2d at 824–25. 
 269. See supra notes 205–06, 222–25, and accompanying text. 
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requiring a contract.270 
Second, informed consent affords far broader protections to 
human subjects than would exist under common law notions of 
contracts.271 These broader protections are, in one part, due to 
dignitary concerns for research subjects and, in another part, 
due to the recognition of the significant imbalance in 
knowledge and bargaining power that exists between 
researchers and researcher subjects.272 As such, the law does 
not allow a research subject to agree to unreasonable or 
unnecessary risks, no matter how informed the consent.273 
Informed consent documents must also include far greater 
disclosures than would be required under contract law, 
including, for example, disclosures about the purpose of the 
research study and disclosures of alternative procedures and 
treatments that may be beneficial for the research subject.274 
Furthermore, while a party who breaches a contract may be 
liable for damages or specific performance, informed consent 
agreements must include a statement that the research subject 
may discontinue participation in the research at any time and 
without any penalty or loss of benefits to which he is 
entitled.275 Finally, unlike contracts, informed consent 
                                                          
 270. See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding 
that an informed consent agreement created a bailor-bailee relationship that, 
under Virginia state law, did not require a formal contract or actual meeting 
of the minds). 
 271. Here we are considering federal laws governing informed consent as 
providing the baseline for protections afforded to human research subjects. 
The Common Rule and FDA rules governing informed consent both provide 
that “the informed consent requirements in [these policies] are not intended to 
preempt any applicable federal, state, or local laws which require additional 
information to be disclosed in order for informed consent to be legally 
effective.” 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(d) (2012). 
 272. Press Release, Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics, Berman 
Institute Scholar Calls for a New Legal, Ethical Framework for Research with 
Human Tissue Specimens (June 18, 2010), 
http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/web/module/press/pressid/230/interior.asp 
(“‘Informed consent was not conceptualized as a contract between two 
individuals with equal bargaining power,’ says Javitt, who has closely 
examined some of the best-known court cases involving the rights and 
expectations of human tissue contributors. ‘Rather, informed consent is an 
ethical duty that the researcher owes the human subject under conditions that 
historically have involved unequal power.’”) 
 273. Grimes 782 A. 2d at 815. 
 274. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2012). 
 275. Id. 
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agreements may not include any exculpatory language that 
releases the researcher from liability for negligence or that 
waives any of the research subject’s legal rights.276 
Some commentators have argued that informed consent 
agreements, especially in the context of non-therapeutic human 
tissue and genetic research, are also different from contracts 
because the human source of these tissues and genetic data 
receive no specific benefit from the exchange and, as such, 
there is no consideration to support the creation of a 
contract.277 This is again an instance where different state 
courts may reach different outcomes. A plaintiff human subject 
may well be able to argue that the potential improvement to 
medical knowledge and clinical care resulting from the 
research on the biospecimen or data is a sufficient benefit to 
the human source or that the restrictions placed on the 
researcher by the informed consent agreement constitute a 
sufficient legal detriment to the researcher sufficient to satisfy 
the requisite need for consideration. 
As such, informed consent documents can be regarded as 
contracts subject to multiple regulatory interactions or as 
quasi-contracts. Just because an informed consent agreement 
satisfies the regulatory requirements for informed consent does 
not mean that a state court could not or would not also use that 
agreement as the basis for resolving a contractual dispute as to 
what can or cannot be done with a human source’s biospecimen 
or genetic data covered by that agreement. 
A case-and-point example of this comes from the York v. 
Jones case decided in 1989 by the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia.278 Plaintiffs Steven and Risa York sought 
the release and transfer of their frozen pre-zygote from the 
defendant Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine to another 
institution.279 The plaintiffs had signed a Cryopreservation 
Agreement with the Jones Institute that contained all the 
necessary components for informed consent under federal and 
state regulations (and which had been approved by an IRB as 
such) and which also contained language stating that, should 
the plaintiffs no longer wish to use their frozen pre-zygotes for 
                                                          
 276. Id; see also Grimes at 850 (holding “Researchers cannot ever be 
permitted to completely immunize themselves by reliance on consents . . . .”). 
 277. See, e.g., Ram, supra note 7, at 163–64. 
 278. York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
 279. Id. at 422. 
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initiating pregnancy, the plaintiffs could choose one of three 
options for what to do with their remaining frozen pre-zygotes: 
donate them to another infertile couple, donate them for 
research, or have them thawed but not allowed to develop (i.e., 
have them destroyed).280 The defendant refused the plaintiffs’ 
request to transfer the frozen pre-zygotes to another institution 
on the grounds that the Cryopreservation Agreement limited 
the plaintiffs’ control over the frozen pre-zygotes to only the 
three enumerated options set forth in the agreement.281 The 
defendants further argued that, because the Cryopreservation 
Agreement incorporated the informed consent agreement, 
inter-institutional transfer could not be allowed because it had 
not been included as one of the options assessed and approved 
by the IRB.282 In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and quasi-contract, the 
district court held that the terms of Cryopreservation 
Agreement associated with statutory requirements for 
informed consent “do not conflict with any other terms of the 
Agreement” and that “the failure of the [IRB] to consider the 
ramifications of the inter-institutional transfer of 
cryopreserved human pre-zygotes does not vitiate the contract 
between these parties nor does it usurp this Court’s jurisdiction 
to settle a contractual dispute between these parties.”283 The 
court further held that “the Cryopreservation Agreement 
should be more strictly construed against the defendants, the 
parties who drafted the Agreement.”284 
There are several relevant fact patterns that arise here to 
demonstrate how state courts may handle issues of informed 
consent in biobank research using principles of contract law. 
The first fact pattern involves the collection, use, disclosure, or 
transfer of a biospecimen or data when there is a refusal to 
consent to some or any of these activities. A human source’s 
explicit rejection of some or any of these activities (for example, 
through a refusal to sign a consent agreement or through the 
use of an opt-out clause) would most certainly require honoring, 
under both principles of contract law285 and informed consent. 
                                                          
 280. Id. at 424–25. 
 281. Id. at 425. 
 282. Id. at 425–26. 
 283. Id. at 426. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Under contract law, such an explicit rejection may be regarded as the 
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It is more difficult to see how deidentification would get around 
such an explicit rejection. 
The second related fact pattern is one involving the 
collection, use, disclosure, or transfer of a biospecimen or data 
when there is no informed consent at all,286 a practice that has 
been interpreted by some as permissible under the current 
Common Rule and which seems to be more greatly encouraged 
under the proposed changes in the ANPRM. One can easily see 
a state court holding that a party provided with no consent or 
insufficient consent deserves at least as many rights and at 
least as much protection as a party afforded the opportunity to 
reject consent, especially given the York court’s analysis that 
an informed consent agreement should be more strictly 
construed against the party who drafted it. 
The third fact pattern is one where valid consent for use, 
disclosure, or transfer is granted for some specific purpose but 
is silent as to other potential uses. If that consent is later 
withdrawn, it is easy to see how a state court might decide that 
a biospecimen that can no longer be used for the research 
purpose stated in the informed consent agreement can also not 
be used for a different purpose that is not mentioned in the 
informed consent agreement. Again, deidentification remains a 
dubious argument for reaching a different outcome. 
Furthermore, if there is evidence to suggest that researcher 
obtaining the consent knew that the biospecimen would be used 
for another purpose than that disclosed in the informed consent 
agreement, then a plaintiff human source may have a claim 
that the informed consent should be voidable as a product of 
misrepresentation to induce entry into the agreement. 
A final fact pattern is one similar to that in the case of 
Moore where consent to collection of a biospecimen is granted 
in the context of clinical care. A plaintiff human source may 
well be able to argue that any research use granted in such a 
form of consent is the product of undue influence or duress, 
especially if signed in the course of an emergency medical 
intervention. A plaintiff may also raise claims of undue 
influence or unconscionability resulting from the considerable 
power imbalance that exists between a patient and a physician, 
                                                          
human source’s rejection of the researcher’s offer to use the source’s 
biospecimen or data in research. No contract would be found to exist in such a 
scenario. 
 286. There can be a lack of consent due to the literal absence of any consent 
or due to an ineffective consent such as that in Grimes. 
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especially in the course of medical care. The issue of the 
validity of consent from a minor (and whether that consent 
must be renewed upon the person reaching the age of majority) 
raises even more complex issues. 
Under notions of contract law and informed consent law, 
the rights and limitations arising from informed consent should 
“travel with” the biospecimen or data unless a new informed 
consent agreement says otherwise. It is the obligation of the 
person who first obtains informed consent to hold the 
biospecimen to ensure that the terms of that informed consent 
travel with the biospecimen in the event of a transfer to a 
subsequent holder. The subsequent holder will then have an 
obligation to comply with the original informed consent and to 
ensure its passing down the line to another subsequent holder 
and so on. Deidentification should not be sufficient to break any 
limitations established by the original consent unless so agreed 
to in that or in another consent. A subsequent holder may have 
a claim against a previous holder if the subsequent holder 
suffers an injury due to the failure of the previous holder to 
obtain or to properly transfer informed consent. 
We now return to our hypothetical Plaintiff and the 
possible state law contract-based causes of action that he can 
pursue. The Plaintiff could argue that his consent to allow 
Hospital A and Dr. Physician to excise his tissues was limited 
to the scope of his clinical care and that there was no informed 
consent or insufficient informed consent to allow Hospital A or 
Dr. Physician to collect or transfer his biospecimen for storage 
or research use. As discussed below, this can lead to a complex 
situation of multiple jurisdictions with multiple common law 
and statutory systems being applied to a common set of facts. 
D. ISSUES OF JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND CHOICE OF LAW 
Our hypothetical situation demonstrates the range of 
procedural and substantive issues that can easily arise in the 
context of IFs and secondary research. Let us assume that, 
having established various potential causes of action arising 
under state statutory and common law, our hypothetical 
Plaintiff’s attorney now begins a joint analysis of personal 
jurisdiction and venue to determine which states’ laws are 
relevant for each potential defendant. 
Hospital A and Dr. Physician are certainly subject to 
personal jurisdiction in Blue since that is the state in which 
006 FATEHI HALL_PROOF - SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012  1:16 PM 
2012] ENFORCING THE RIGHTS OF HUMAN SOURCES 647 
they are located, the state in which they transact their 
business, and the state in which the activities giving rise to 
Plaintiff’s claim occurred.287 Because Plaintiff was a resident of 
Red at the time of the activities giving rise to his potential 
claim against Hospital A and Dr. Physician, Plaintiff may be 
able to establish personal jurisdiction in Red if there exists a 
general or specific long arm statute authorizing such exercise of 
jurisdiction.288 Absent such a statutory basis, however, it is 
unlikely that Plaintiff can successfully argue that Red has 
general jurisdiction over Hospital A or Dr. Physician on the 
basis of continuous and systematic activity289 or specific 
jurisdiction on the basis of minimum contacts290 given several 
recent court decisions rejecting personal jurisdiction over 
hospitals on these grounds.291 Similarly, while Plaintiff is now 
a resident of Purple, it is unlikely that personal jurisdiction 
over Hospital A or Dr. Physician exists in this state absent a 
long arm statute. 
With respect to Biobank B, Plaintiff can establish personal 
jurisdiction in the state of Green where Biobank B is located 
                                                          
 287. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945). 
 288. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2012). 
 289. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 
415–16 (1984) (holding that, in order for a court to exercise general in 
personam jurisdiction over a party, the party must have “continuous and 
systematic” contact with the forum state unless the party’s contacts with a 
forum state are related to the cause of action in question). 
 290. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S., at 316 (holding that a court may exercise specific 
in personam jurisdiction over a party if the party has sufficient minimum 
contacts with the forum state such that maintain the suit there does not  
“offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”). 
 291. See, e.g., Zavala v. El Paso County Hospital, 172 P.3d 173 (N.M. 2007). 
In this case, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico affirmed a district court’s 
finding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit filed by New Mexico 
resident plaintiffs against two Texas doctors and a Texas hospital. The Court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that general and specific personal jurisdiction 
existed despite a patient transfer contract between the Texas hospital and a 
New Mexico hospital, a large number of New Mexico residents treated at the 
Texas hospital, the Texas hospital’s status as a registered Medicaid provider 
in New Mexico, and the Texas hospitals accreditation as a regional trauma 
center serving the border region between Texas and New Mexico. The Court 
instead relied on the defendants’ claims that the Texas hospital did not 
intentionally solicit New Mexico patients. The Court concluded that subjecting 
the Texas Hospital to personal jurisdiction in New Mexico would offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice because New Mexico’s 
interest protecting the rights of its citizens was mitigated by the fact that the 
injury took place out of state and outweighed by considerations for fairness, 
efficiency, and public policy. See also Harlow v. Children’s Hospital, 432 F.3d 
50 (1st Cir. 2005). 
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and transacting business and where the unauthorized use of 
the biospecimen took place, giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims. 
Jurisdiction may also exist in Red or Purple depending on the 
existence of a long arm statute. Plaintiff may also be able to 
establish personal jurisdiction against Biobank B in the state of 
Blue on the grounds that Biobank B had sufficient minimum 
contacts with Blue as evidenced by its knowing and intentional 
practice of obtaining biospecimens from a hospital in Blue and 
by its purposeful availment of Blue’s informed consent laws 
that governed the collection and transfer of the biospecimen in 
question.292 If Plaintiff can adequately state a claim that the 
injuries he suffered as a result of the undisclosed IF were in 
part due to Biobank B’s failure to obtain informed consent or to 
Biobank B’s unauthorized transfer of the biospecimen to 
Research Institute C, then Plaintiff may also be able to argue 
that Biobank B should be subject to personal jurisdiction in the 
state of Yellow since Biobank B knowingly and intentionally 
transferred the biospecimen to a research institution in that 
state and as such could reasonably anticipate being subject to a 
suit in that state pertaining to that transfer.293 
Finally, with respect to Research Institute C and Dr. 
Investigator, there is personal jurisdiction in the state of 
Yellow and potentially in Red or Purple on the basis of the 
same analysis used above. Research Institute C and, perhaps, 
Dr. Investigator may also be subject to personal jurisdiction in 
the state of Green where Biobank B is located because they 
intentionally obtained their biospecimens from there and 
availed themselves of Green state law governing informed 
consent and the transfer of biomaterials. 
It is likely that a suit by Plaintiff against one or several of 
these potential defendants would result in a complex web of 
cross claims, joinders, impleaders, and the like. As such, we 
                                                          
 292. See United States v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 623-24 
(1st Cir. 2001) (“The purposeful availment inquiry . . . focuses on the 
defendant’s intentionality. This prong is only satisfied when the defendant 
purposefully and voluntarily directs his activities toward the forum so that he 
should expect, by virtue of the benefit he receives, to be subject to the court’s 
jurisdiction based on [his contacts with the forum].”). 
 293. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 
(1980) (explaining that a court’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction can 
depend on whether “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum 
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 
there.”). 
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will not belabor the intricacies of which state’s law a court 
might decide to apply. Our point, simply stated, is that each 
collection site, biobank, and secondary researcher in the 
biobank research system faces a veritable patchwork of state 
laws under which it might be accountable. The decision to avoid 
informed consent and return of IFs through deidentification 
practices permissible under federal law may be expeditious and 
may reduce administrative and financial burdens in the short 
term—but in the longer term, such a decision may very well 
prove to be far more costly and burdensome than expected. 
E. STATE LAW IS NOT PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 
As we demonstrate, both federal and state law applies to 
research using biospecimens, the rights and obligations of 
biobanks and researchers, and the rights of human sources.  An 
obvious question is whether the federal system preempts state 
laws (whether common law or statutes) that might provide 
additional or different rights and obligations. Indeed, 
researchers or research institutions that do not wish to be 
subject to these various state law systems might well try to 
argue that the federal system—notably the Common Rule and 
FDA analog—should preempt state law requirements. 
Overall, preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause in 
the United States Constitution.294  Under the Supremacy 
Clause, the federal government can (absent some specific 
restriction such as the 21st Amendment295) establish laws or 
regulations within its sphere that override state law. In the 
case of research on human biospecimens and genetic data, 
there can be federal control based on either the use of federal 
funds to directly or indirectly support the research in 
question296 or upon interstate commerce.297 
Given the breadth of federal funding of research and the 
breadth of the interstate commerce clause, it is hard to imagine 
any significant research which could be totally outside of 
federal oversight. However, just because the federal 
government has the Constitutional authority to exercise 
oversight or even has exercised oversight does not mean that 
                                                          
 294. U.S. CONST. Art. VI Clause 2. 
 295. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 296. Note that the current Common Rule is largely based on federal 
research funding. 
 297. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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states cannot also exercise oversight.  The question of whether 
these state oversight schemes can exist along with the federal 
system is answer by the law surrounding preemption. 
There are three general types of preemption which could 
provide the result desired by these stakeholders: express 
preemption, implied or field preemption, and conflict 
preemption. Express preemption exists when Congress has 
explicitly stated its intent that the oversight or regulatory 
system it has created replaces all state or local systems.298  
This requires an express statement of congressional intent to 
preempt.  A classic express preemption case is Riegel v. 
Medtronic.299 Riegel involves a state product liability case over 
an allegedly defective medical device.  In 1976, Congress 
enacted 21 U.S.C. § 360k which states, in relevant part: 
(a) General Rule. Except as provided in subsection (b), no State or 
political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect 
with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement— 
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement 
applicable under this Act to the device, and 
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to 
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the 
device under this Act.300 
The Supreme Court analyzed this express preemption 
provision and rules that any state law claim that was “different 
from, or in addition to” a federal provision was preempted 
meaning that the state action must be dismissed.301 
However, there is no federal statutory equivalent to § 360k 
(or other similar congressional pronouncements) in the 
Common Rule or FDA analog.  In fact, as previously discussed, 
both the Common Rule and the FDA analog contain provisions 
expressly stating that human subjects retain any rights they 
have under other federal, state, or local laws and that 
researchers cannot waive liability under these other laws. As 
such, researchers’ arguments for express preemption would 
fail. 
                                                          
 298. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990). 
 299. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315 (2008). 
 300. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2006). 
 301. Id. at 327–28. The Court left open the possibility of a state action that 
is “parallel” to the federal system.  For example, if FDA required a specific 
label on a medical device and the defendant failed to include the required 
language on the label, the plaintiff’s claim (assuming proximate causation) 
might well be a “parallel” claim under Riegel and permitted to continue. 
006 FATEHI HALL_PROOF - SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012  1:16 PM 
2012] ENFORCING THE RIGHTS OF HUMAN SOURCES 651 
The second type of preemption is implied or field 
preemption.  Courts look to see whether the federal 
government has so occupied a field as to imply intent to 
preempt state law.302  Courts also look to see whether the 
Congressional purpose behind the federal law would be 
frustrated by other state oversight systems or requirements.303  
Given the historical role of the states in protecting their 
citizens and in regulating the practice of medicine, health care 
provider interactions with patients, and requirements for 
informed consent, implied preemption would be difficult, if not 
impossible to establish.  As we discuss above, state legislatures 
have been active in establishing state statutory systems 
applicable to much of the research at issue.  This further 
demonstrates the well-accepted role of the states in protecting 
its citizens and in regulating research within their borders. 
The Supreme Court recently refused in Wyeth v. Levine to 
find implied preemption in a product liability case involving a 
prescription drug and arising under Vermont state law. 304  
Note that both the medical device in Riegel and the drug in 
Levine are regulated federally by the FDA.  However, because 
(1) the express preemption provisions of § 360k apply only to 
medical devices and (2) there is a historic role for states in tort 
law, the Supreme Court refused to find implied or field 
preemption in the case of Levine.305  And yet, the federal 
oversight of drugs and medical devices is orders of magnitude 
greater than is federal oversight of research.  If this more 
extensive regulatory system was not sufficient to establish 
preemption, then the less regulated world of research will also 
not be preempted.306 
Finally, there is conflict preemption (also known as 
impossibility preemption).  If the federal and state 
requirements cannot both be satisfied, the federal requirement 
prevails.307  Conflict preemption is a difficult case to establish 
and requires either a literal impossibility to satisfy both federal 
                                                          
 302. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
 303. Wyeth v. Levine 555 U.S. 555, 575 (2009). 
 304. Id., at 580–81. 
 305. Id., at 565. 
 306. Interestingly, key physician groups such as the New England Journal 
of Medicine opposed preemption in both cases. It would seem that they would 
be hard pressed to argue for preemption only in a situation in which it was to 
their benefit. 
 307. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
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and state requirements (actual conflict)308 or a demonstration 
that the state law is “an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”309  
Requirements which are additive or more restrictive generally 
do not trigger conflict preemption. The Common Rule and FDA 
analog rarely create a requirement that could conflicts so 
directly with a state requirement. 
When considering conflict preemption, it is critical to 
understand that a state can impose substantially greater 
requirements or additional requirements without triggering 
conflict preemption.  Just because the Common Rule does not 
require a particular disclosure or permits a particular type of 
research does not preempt a state requirement for more 
disclosure or for limiting certain research. 
As such, absent Congress intervening and enacting an 
express preemption statute, researcher will be unable to 
succeed with a preemption defense. It is interesting to note that 
the defendants in cases such as Bearder, Grimes, and 
Greenberg did not raise any meaningful preemption defenses. 
Preemption offers the biobank research system little comfort if 
they face state law based tort, contract, property, or other 
claims. 
CONCLUSION 
While there is growing attention to the issue of incidental 
finding disclosures from secondary research using biospecimens 
and genetic data stored in biobanks, the focus of this attention 
has been too narrow in several ways. First, there has been little 
attention brought to the growing discordance between the 
practices allowed under federal human subjects research 
regulations and the very principles by which these regulations 
are to protect the rights and welfare of human research 
subjects—namely incentives created by the Common Rule for 
researchers to deidentify biospecimens and data in order to 
avoid requirements for informed consent, IRB review, and 
disclosures of IFs. Second, there has been little attention paid 
to the pivotal role that state laws play in determining the 
rights of human subjects and the responsibilities of 
                                                          
 308. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–143 
(1963). 
 309. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
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researchers. 
In many ways, the apparent decision of some in the 
research community to hang their hats on the federal law is 
one of familiarity and convenience. Researchers are accustomed 
to dealing with the Common Rule.  State courts and 
legislatures are more complex and fragmented.  State 
institutions, by nature of being presented with different and 
unfamiliar issues arising from a nascent technologies and new 
forms of research, have proceeded cautiously (though not 
unreasonably so given the breadth of the issues) to fully digest 
and decide how state statutes and common law principles 
interact with the complex problems put before them. In several 
instances state courts or legislatures have decided cases in 
great favor of researchers and the enterprise of biomedical 
research. However, a great majority of the relevant court cases 
demonstrate that it is state law and not federal law that is 
deciding and will continue to decide the rights and 
responsibilities that arising from the collection, use, and 
transfer of biospecimens and genetic data. A growing number of 
states are enacting their own statutory regimes to provide 
human sources of these biospecimens and data with protections 
often greater than those provided under federal laws. So, too, 
are we seeing a growing number of state judicial decisions, such 
as the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Bearder, in which 
courts are construing applicable laws favorably for plaintiff 
human sources or, as in Grimes, outright calling into question 
the underlying motivations of researchers and IRBs in forgoing 
disclosures and informed consent. 
Indeed biobank research entities are being faced with two 
emerging tides—a federal tide washing away some of the 
protections afforded research subjects and a state tide bringing 
to shore new, often stronger, protections. The rush of 
researchers to surf the first wave may very well end with 
getting slammed by the second wave. 
 
